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I. Introduction
In my previous article published in this Law Review, l) I addressed the pressing
reasons why genetic discrimination, if any, should be legally banned, and examined 
the nature and character of genetic information by reviewing the arguments of 
"genetic exceptionalism." However, I did not address the present legal responses to 
this matter nor examine the underlying issues and problems of genetic anti-
discrimination laws. 
  In this Paper, I will review current "patchwork" legal protections against genetic 
discrimination in the health insurance and employment settings at the federal evel 
and state level in the United States respectively. 
   The present legal protection regime in the U.S. over the issue of genetic 
discrimination is called "patchwork" or "piecemeal" protections because, as of fall 
in 2005, no comprehensive genetic-specific anti-discrimination law at the federal 
level has been enacted although the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
was passed in the U.S. Senate on February 17, 2005.2) Therefore, on the federal 
level, legal protection against genetic discrimination so far is provided partly by 
each of various différent legal sources. In the following sections, I will look into 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Executive Order, Regulations (policy guidelines) of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and several judicial decisions 
related to the interpretation of these laws and regulations. The primary objective of 
these reviews is to examine to what extent the currently existing laws give legal 
protection in prohibiting genetic discrimination in employment and insurance, and 
also to identify the limitations and shortcomings of such patchwork legal 
protections. I confirm, as many commentators have pointed out, that the present 
patchwork protections provided at the federal level are insufficient in banning
1) Privacy of Genetic Information, 52 OSAKA UNIv. LAW REV. pp. 75-105 (2005). 1 asserted that 
   legal protections against genetic discrimination are indispensable in order to prevent creating a 
   "genetic underclass
," to preserve the "right to know" and "right not to know" of out own genetic 
   information, to eliminate fear which discourages people from undergoing genetic tests or 
   participating in genetic research, and as a result, to develop medicine and biology, and ultimately 
   enhance public health by curing and preventing enetic diseases which will lead to cutting overall 
   health care costs. 
2) 5.306. Official Title of the bill is "A bill to prohibit discrimination on the basis of genetic 
   information with respect o health insurance and employment.
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genetic discrimination. Indeed, the limitations of the existing federal laws 
prompted state legislatures to enact their own genetic-specific anti-discrimination 
statutes which provide more comprehensive protection against genetic 
discrimination. In section III, by briefly surveying such state statutes, I confirm, as 
many scholars have asserted, that state statutes vary widely state by state and 
therefore, cannot provide consistent legal protection and also some statutes give 
inadequate protection attributed to their mal-defined genetic information. This 
understanding is proved by the fact that many attempts have been made to enact a 
genetic-specific nondiscrimination legislation at the federal level. However, 
although many federal bills have been introduced in each session of the U.S. 
Congress since 1995, none of these bills were passed until 2003 nor enacted to date.
II. Existing Federal Legal Protections and Limitations
A. Federal Legal Protections in Health Insurance
  As of fall in 2005, there is no uniform, comprehensive federal legal legislation 
against genetic discrimination that has been passed in the House of Representatives 
in the U.S. Congress, although a couple of such bills were passed in the Senate3). 
However, genetic privacy of the people is protected partly by existing federal legal 
protections and each state's anti-discrimination legislation. These present legal 
protections are sometimes called "patch-work protection"4) or "piece-meal 
solution."5) In this section, I review these legal protections against genetic 
discrimination and protection for genetic privacy. And then I describe several 
shortcomings that have been pointed out by commentators and assert that a 
comprehensive, uniform federal genetic legislation is needed to cap the legal 
loopholes of the present patch-work legal protections.
    a. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
  To date, the only federal legislation which explicitly addresses restrictions on 
insurers' using genetic information discriminatorily is the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (also known as "Kennedy-Kassebaum
3) 
4)
5)
In Section IV, these bills will be reviewed. 
See, e.g., Wendy Lovejoy, Ending the Genetic Discrimination Barrier: Regalning Confidence in 
Preconception, Prenatal, and Neonatal Genetic Testing, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 873, 907 (2001). 
See, e.g., Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fuir/Unfair-Discrimination Dilemma 
in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 KY. L.J. 503, 533 (1996-97).
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Act") (hereinafter "HIPAA" ).6)
i. Protections 
  HIPAA prescribes several legal protections for the insured and prospective 
policyholders in terms of eligibility for enrollment, coverage, renewal and the like. 
  Wendy Lovejoy well describes everal egal protections for genetic information 
under HIPAA. 
1) "HIPAA does not allow group health plan or health insurers offering group 
coverage to treat genetic information as a preexisting condition, which would 
enable the insurer to exclude that condition from coverage."7) 
2) "group health plans cannot deem an applicant ineligible for enrollment in the 
group plan based on genetic information or health status." 8
3) "HIPAA prevents group health plans from charging higher premiums based on 
genetic information than the plan charges other 'similarly situated individual[s] 
enrolled in the plan. "'9) 
4) "HIPAA provides special protections for newborns and pregnancies."1o> 
"Group health plans may not enforce preexisting condition exclusions against 
pregnancy-related conditions during the month following birth."11) 
5) HIPAA "requires health insurers to renew individual coverage at the option of 
the insured, except in cases of fraud, nonpayment of premiums, or other terminating 
events."12) "There are no limitations, however, on the premiums that may be 
charged under the renewed policy."13) 
  Lovejoy explains several actual implications of these provisions under HIPAA:
[F]or individuals who undergo genetic arrier screening and find they are 
the carrier of Tay Sachs, this part of their medical record cannot be used 
to deny them eligibility to enroll on a group health plan. Additionally, a 
pregnant woman who learns through prenatal genetic testing that her 
baby has spina bifida cannot be excluded from her group health plan for
6)
7) 
8) 
9)
104 Public Law No. 104-191, 701, 110, STAT, 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered section of 18 
U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
29 U.S.C. § I181(b)(1)(B), I182(a)(1)(F), 1182 (b)(1) (Supp.Il 1996) (emphasis added). 
29 U.S.C. §1182 (a)(1)(A), (F) (emphasis added). 
29 U.S.C. §1182 (b)(1) (emphasis added).
10) 29 U.S.C. § 1181(d)(1), (3) (emphasis added). 
11) 29 U.S.C. § 1181(d)(1), (3). 
12) 42 U.S.C. §300gg-42 (Supp. Il 1996) (emphasis added). 
13) Wendy Lovejoy, supra note 4, at 904 (2001).
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having a preexisting condition. Furthermore, a newborn covered under a 
group health plan and testing positive for PKU can undergo treatment for 
PKU without the parents being worried about the treatment being 
excluded as a preexisting condition. 14)
ii. Limitations 
  Chetan Gulati addresses the limitations of HIPAA in preventing genetic 
discrimination. 
1) HIPAA "does not prohibit insurers from requiring genetic tests as a condition of 
enrollment in a health plan. Therefore, an applicant may be denied coverage or 
charged a higher rate for refusing to comply with a testing requirement." 
2) "HIPAA does not apply to those who are individual policy holders and who are 
the most susceptible to genetic différentiation." 
3) "HIPAA does not prohibit the use of genetic information in risk classification 
and insurance underwriting. Therefore, HIPAA does not deny insurers the ability 
to raise rates, exclude coverage for certain conditions and impose lifetime caps on 
certain benefits, provided they are applied to the group." 
4) "the new regulations do not control the prise of insurance because the Act does 
not prevent insurance companies from raising rates for entire groups, which can 
have the saure effect as denying coverage." 
5) "the provision does not define what constitutes genetic information, making it 
difficult to know whether or not the provision has been violated." 
6) "under HIPAA, the remedies available to an individual are very limited and the 
penalties that could be imposed on an employer amount o no more than $100 per 
day.,,15) 
  Lovejoy also points out the limitations of HIPAA in preventing genetic 
discrimination:
The largest population that HIPAA leaves unprotected is insureds in the 
individual market. For the 14.5 million Americans who acquire health 
insurance through nongroup plans, their genetic information can be used 
by insurers to raise premiums and cut benefits. For example, if a woman 
in the individual market undergoes genetic testing and finds that she is a 
carrier of sickle cell disease, her individual market insurer can access her
14) Id. 
15) Chetan Gulati, Genetic Antidiscrimination Laws In Health Insurance: A Misguided Solution, 4 
   QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 149, 200 (2001).
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genetic testing results and place a low cap on pregnancy related claims or 
exclude pregnancy health care altogether. If this woman is in the middle 
class, she will not be eligible for Medicaid as a safety net and could find 
herself with no coverage for prenatal care.16)
Furthermore, for uninsured individuals applying for health insurance in 
the individuel market, insurers can access their genetic information and 
deny eligibility to enroll based on that information. For a pregnant 
couple who learns through prenatal genetic testing that their baby will be 
born with a genetic birth defect, the individual market insurer can refuse 
to insure the baby.17)
HIPAA allows group health insurance plans to respond to the genetic 
information of one group member by raising premiums for the entire 
group. Similarly group health plans can exclude coverage for certain 
conditions or place daim limits on particular conditions, 'provided it is 
not directed at certain individuals.' Thus ... some parents may find that 
their attempt o prevent genetic birth defects through genetic testing is 
used against hem to raise premiums or to deny certain benefits.18)
  Diver and Cohen also describe the shortcomings of HIPAA and state that it 
"applies only to employment-based group health insurance, its provisions do not 
reach the roughly one-third of American workers unprotected by such plans nor, of 
course, the unemployed."19) 
  Lovejoypoints out that "[i]f the genetic condition associated with the genetic 
information has been diagnosed, however, then insurers can consider it to be a 
preexisting condition and exclude it from coverage."20)
         b. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 
  Some may try to seek federal legal protection against genetic discrimination 
concerning health insurance coverage by interpreting the Americans with
16) Wendy Lovejoy, supra note 4, at 905. 
17) Id. 
18) Id. 
19) Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong With Genetic 
   Discrimination? 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1450 (2001) 
20) Wendy Lovejoy, supra note 4, at 903 (29 U.S.C. § 1181(b)(1)(B).
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Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). This is because Title III of the ADA provides that 
"[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full 
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 
lease (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.i21) And the 
insurance office is included in the illustrative list of places of "public 
accommodation. "22) 
  Wendy Lovejoy examines this possibility. According to lier, the court decision 
also suggests that "the ADA was intended to apply to access to insurance 
coverage."23)
In Winslow v. IDS Life Insurance Co., the district court followed the 
First Circuit in determining that a place of public accommodation is not 
limited to actual physical structures. The court found that the defendant's 
policy of denying access to disability insurance based on the plaintiff's 
mental health condition "is founded on a disability-based discrimination 
violative of the ADA. ,24)
  However, Lovejoy does not believe that the ADA provides 
for health insurance coverage. She states:
sufficient protection
[T]he ADA allows plans to "refuse to insurer, or refuse to continue to 
insure, or limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an 
individual, or charge a différent rate for the saure coverage' if the 
disparate treatment is 'based on sound actuarial principles or is related to 
actual or reasonably anticipated experience."25)
  She notes that, for example, "prospective parents learning that they are carriers 
of a genetic condition will likely be protected from discrimination since carrier 
status is not likely actuarially to create anticipated expense because carriers will 
never achieve symptoms. The ADA, however, cannot stop the insurer from refusing 
to insure the couple's baby." Moreover, she states that "the insurer may be able to
21) 42 U.S.C. §12182 (a) (1994) (emphasis added).
22) 42 U.S.C. §12181 (7). 
23) Wendy Lovejoy, supra note 4, at 902. 
24) Id. (citing Winslow v. IDS Life Insurance Co. 
25) Id. (quoting Winslow, 29 F. Supp.2d ai 566).
29 F. Supp. 2d 557, 563 (D. Minn. 1998)).
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deny coverage for the woman's pregnancy since it is likely to be associated with 
expensive complications."26) Furthennore, "employers with fewer than fifteen 
employees are exempted from ADA compliance. This exemption leaves insureds in 
employee group-benefit plans unprotected when the group is small."27) 
Furthermore, "the ADA provides no protection for those insured in the individual 
market. "28)
Lynn E. Egan also gives a negative comment on this issue.
[C]omplaints under the ADA against limitations of fringe benefits like 
health insurance, are also similar to those of state legislation combating 
health insurance discrimination when suits were brought against 
companies using self-insured plans. As was seen in McGann, ERISA 
would once again be used to protect an employer's right to limit 
coverage based on inordinate medical expenses incurred by a few 
individuals who would endanger the fiscal solvency of the company, if 
they were to be included in that company's elf-funded insurance plan. 29)
  Eric Mills Holmes also presents a negative opinion on the possibility that the 
ADA effectively regulates genetic discrimination in the employee health insurance 
plan. He notes:
In the spirit of the McCarran Act, the ADA's insurance exemption, 
section 501(c), primarily leaves insurance regulation to the states. The 
ADA, surprisingly, avoids insurance discrimination issues by adopting 
the status quo of conventional risk underwriting based on legitimate 
actuarial support by commercial insurers and self-insured employers. 
These traditional, customary insurance practices in underwriting, 
classifying, and administering risks generally do not constitute 
prohibited discrimination under the ADA, so long as the insurance 
benefit plan is not used as a "subterfuge" to evade the ADA.3o)
26) Id at 903. 
27) Id. 
28) Id. 
29) Lynn E. Egan, Note, Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance, 24 J. LEGis. 237, 244 (1998). 
30) Eric Milis Holmes, supra note 5, ai 605-06.
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  Mark A. Rothstein addresses the great limitation and inadequacies of the ADA 
with regard to the protection for employer-sponsored health insurance for genetic 
conditions. Indeed, provisions under section 501 of the ADA permit a wide range 
of discriminatory discretion for the employers with regard to coverage, 
underwriting risks, classifying risks, etc. First of all, he points out that "[s]ection 
5O1(c) of the ADA makes it clear that the law does not prohibit or restrict 
employers or insurers from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering 
risks. Thus, employers and insurers are not prohibited from treating employees 
differently with regard to health insurance on the basis of their disabilities."31) In 
other words, "[e]mployers are free to discriminate against certain disabilities [such 
as 'kidney dialysis']"32) as long as "other conditions [are] made available to 
employees without disabilities."33) Second, in regards to risk he notes that "[u]nder 
section 501(c)(1) of the ADA, it is not illegal for an insurer to charge higher rates 
for certain conditions, to exclude certain conditions, or to lirait the coverage of 
certain conditions, so long as such action does not violate state law."34) And 
"[s]ection 501(c)(2) permits employers to do the same thing
, se, long as there is no 
violation of state law."35) He quotes the statement in the House report: "In sum, 
section 501(c) is intended to afford to insurers and employers the same 
opportunities they would enjoy in the absence of this legislation to design and 
administer insurance products and benefits plans in a manner that is consistent with 
basic principles of insurance risk classification."36) 
  Rothstein observes:
The legislative history of section 501(c) indicates that arbitrary, 
invidious discrimination i health insurance against individuals with 
disabilities is unlawful but that actuarially-based discrimination is
permissible. Unfortunately, a wide range of employer and insurer 
practices are actuarially-based and therefore legal, including the 
following: exclusion of preexisting conditions, exclusion of coverage for
31) Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Eniployment and the Americans Disabilities Act, 
   29 HOUSTON L. REV. 23, 79 (1992) (referring to 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c)(1) (West Supp.1992)). 
32) Id. 
33) Id. at 80. 
34) Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C.A.§ 12201(c)(1) (West Supp.1992)). 
35) Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C.A.§ 12201(c)(2) (West Supp.1992)). 
36) Id at 81. (quoting House Educ. and Labor Comm., H.R.Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pi. 2, 
   at 137, (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, at 420).
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certain conditions, charging higher premiums for high risk individuals, 
imposing low maximum lifetime caps on payments for certain 
conditions, and the exclusion of dependents.37)
  Lynn E. Egan also states that "if the discrimination falls within actuariat faimess 
as defined under state law, it is not actionable under the ADA, whether ethical or 
not."3s) 
  Rothstein notes the real implications of these provisions by giving the following 
examples.
[A]n individual with hemophilia may not be denied employment based 
on hemophilia, but an employer could establish a $100 lifetime 
maximum for blood transfusions and clotting factor treatment. An 
individual who carried the gene for APKD legally could be offered a job 
where dialysis treatment is not covered by the employer's health 
insurance. An individual who carried the gene for Huntington's disease 
(HD) might be told that no treatment for HD is covered under the 
employer's health insurance poiicy. An employee for a self-insured 
company who had a child with Duchenne muscular dystrophy or cystic 
fibrosis could suddenly lose all dependent coverage.39)
  Accordingly, Rothstein concludes that "[o]f all the areas of the employment 
relationship in which individuals with disabilities face major obstacles, health 
insurance is the area in which the ADA offers the least protection."40) 
  Given the fact that when the ADA was enacted in 1990, it was neither designed 
te, address genetic discrimination or health insurance, it is not surprising that the 
Act offers no protection against genetic discrimination in the employer-sponsored 
health insurance settings. 
  Accordingly,the possibility of the ADA providing legal protection against 
genetic discrimination cannot be found in the health insurance and therefore federal 
protection in the insurance arena rests on HIPPA's limited protection. As discussed 
in the next subsection, the ADA is referred to as the main federal protection against 
genetic discrimination in the employment arena.
37) Id at 81-82 (emphasis added). 
38) Lynn E. Egan, supra note 29, at 244. 
39) Id at 82. 
40) Id at 79.
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B. Federal Laws and Regulations in Employment
  In this section, I review the existing federal laws and regulations which have 
been regarded as providing patch-work protections against genetic discrimination in 
the employment arena: Titie VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Executive Order, 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and EEOC Compliance Manual 
(policy guideline). Especially I will focus on the ADA provisions and examine to 
what extent the ADA can give legal protection to job applicants and employees 
against genetic discrimination.
            a. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
  Paul Steven Miller states that Title VII "also may incidentally provide 
protection against some forms of genetic discrimination, because genetic 
discrimination may have a disparate impact based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin." This is because "an employer may violate Title VII by engaging 
in discrimination based on a genetic trait that disproportionately impacts a 
particular protected group, such as sickle cell disease (individuals of African 
descent) or Tay-Sachs disease (Ashkenazi Jews)."41) 
  According to his book titled "YouR GENETic DESTtNY", Milunsky, a medical 
geneticist and Professor of Human Genetics and Director of the Center for Human 
Genetics notes the correlation between inherited genetic disorders and particular 
ethnie groups.42) It is reported that "[o]ne in 27 to 1 in 30 Ashkenazic Jews carries 
a Tay-Sachs disease gene mutation. Without testing, about 1 birth in 3,600 would 
be that of an affected infant-100 times the number of such births in the non-
Ashkenazic population."43) And it is reported that "about 1 in 600 blacks in the 
United States are affected by Sickle Cell disease."44) And also it is found that 
Cystic Fibrosis "is most frequently encountered among whites, 1 in 25 of whom are 
carriers. .. The frequency of various cystic fibrosis gene mutations varies among 
ethnie groups within the white population."45) 
  Chetan Gulati also notes that "[i]t is possible that an employer could refuse to 
hire employees who are members of a protected group based on the fact that
41) Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 189, 191 
  (1998). 
42) AUBREY MILUNSKY, YOUR GENETIC DESTINY 85-97 (PERSEUS PUBLISHING 2001). 
43) Id. ai 86. 
44) Id. at 93. 
45) Id. at 92.
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members of that group are more likely to carry the gene for a particular genetic 
disorder."46) And Gulati states that "a disparate impact daim under Title VII [of 
the Civil Right Act of 1964] would probably be the most effective way to combat 
this form of discriminatory hiring."47) 
  However, Miller notes that "many, if not most, genetically related diseases and 
disorders do not disproportionately affect one of Title VII's protected classes; thus, 
Title VII does not provide comprehensive protection against genetic discrimination 
in employment."48) 
  Elaine Draper also mentions Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as one of 
the potential federal level legal protections against employment discrimination. 
She notes that
[Title VII] provides limited protection against genetic discrimination by 
making it illegal for employers to limit, segregate, or classify employees 
in any way that would tend to deprive individuals of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect their status as employees, 
where screening programs disproportionately affect a class protected 
under Title VII (such as race, sex, or ethnicity) or treat a protected class 
differently.49)
  Elaine Draper gives "prime examples of disorders that could give rise to 
disparate impact daims" and notes that "G-6-PD deficiency, sickle-cell trait, and 
hypertension ... are found among blacks at a higher rate than the rest of the 
population."5(» However, Draper asserts that "Title VII reaches genetic testing and 
discrimination only if the genetic trait at issue traces gender, race, or ethnic line. A 
limited number of genetic traits meet this qualification. "51) 
  Draper addresses the employers' defense:
An employer can avoid liability for a policy that discriminates according 
to protected status only upon presenting a valid business justification. If
46) Chetan Gulati, Genetic Antidiscrimination Laws In Health Insurance: A Misguided Solution, 4 
   QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 149, 201 (2001). 
47) Id. 
48) Paul Steven Miller, supra note 41, at 191-92. 
49) Elaine Draper, The Screening ofAmerica: The Social and Legal Framework of'Emplovers' Use of' 
   Genetic Information, 20 BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT & LABOR L. 286, 308-09 (1999). 
50) Id. at 309. 
51) Id. at 310.
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an employer discriminates intentionally, the employer must show that the 
exclusion based on genetic predisposition is a bona fide occupational 
qualification. If an employer is found to have a policy that 
unintentionally discriminates on the basin of protected status, the 
employer can escape liability by showing the classification is related to 
the position in question and consistent with a business necessity.52)
  She states that "even if an employer's genetic policy discriminates on an 
impermissible basis, it is unlikely the discrimination would be intentional. If so, an 
employer would have to satisfy only the less-rigorous business necessity defense, 
making it more likely the policy would survive judicial scrutiny."53) Accordingly, 
we can say that Title VII has a limited protection against genetic discrimination in 
the workplace.
                      b. Executive Order 
  On February 8, 2000, former President William J. Clinton signed an executive 
order, titled "To Prohibit Discrimination in Federal Employment Based on Genetic 
Information."54) The Order prohibits federal employers from using genetic 
information to discriminate against employees. Section I of the Order states: "It is 
the policy of the Government of the United States to provide equal employment 
opportunity in Federal employment for all qualified persons and to prohibit 
discrimination against employees based on protected genetic information, or 
information about a request for or the receipt of genetic services."55) [emphasis 
added] 
  Under the Executive Order, "protected genetic information" is defined broadly: 
it means "(A) information about an individual's genetic tests; (B) information about 
the genetic tests of an individual's family members; or (C) information about the 
occurrence of a disease, or medical condition or disorder in family members of the 
individual."56) However, it adds that "[i]nformation about an individual's current 
health status (including information about sex, age, physical exams, and chemical, 
blood, or urine analyses) is not protected genetic information."57)
52), Id. at 309 (emphases added). 
53) Id. at 310. 
54) Exec. Order No. 13145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877, 2000 WL 142053 (Pres.) (Feb.8, 2000). 
55) Id. § 1-101. 
56) Id. 6878 § 1-201 (e)(1)(A)-(C). 
57) Id. 6878 § 1-101 (2).
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Section 1-202 states:
(a) The employing department or agency shah not discharge, fail or 
refuse to hire, or otherwise discriminate against any employee with 
respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment of that employee, because of protected genetic information 
with respect o the employee, or because of information about a request 
for or the receipt of genetic services by such employee.
(b) The employing department or agency shah not limit, segregate, or 
classify employees in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive any 
employee of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect hat 
employee's tatus, because of protected genetic information with respect 
to the employee or because of information about a request for or the 
receipt of genetic services by such employee.
(c) The employing department or agency shah not request, require, 
collect, or purchase protected genetic information with respect to an 
employee, or information about a request for or the receipt of genetic 
services by such employee.
(d) The employing department or agency shah not disclose protected 
genetic information with respect o an employee, or information about a 
request for or the receipt of genetic services by an employee xcept: (1) 
to the employee who is the subject of the information, at his or her 
request; (2) to an occupational or other health researcher, if the research 
conducted complies with the regulations and protections provided for 
under part 46 of title 45, of the Code of Federal Regulations; (3) if 
required by a Federal statute, congressional subpoena, or an order issued 
by a court of competent jurisdiction, except hat if the subpoena or court 
order was secured without the knowledge of the individual to whom the 
information refers, the employer shall provide the individual with 
adequate notice to challenge the subpoena or court order, unless the 
subpoena or court order also imposes confidentiality requirements; or (4) 
to executive branch officials investigating compliance with this order, if 
the information is relevant o the investigation.
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(e) The employing department or agency shah not maintain protected 
genetic information or information about a request for or the receipt of 
genetic services in general personnel files; such information shah be 
treated as confidential medical records and kept separate from personnel 
files. 58)
  Natalie E. Zindorf notes that "[a]ccording to the Executive Order, federal 
employers are prohibited from requiring genetic testing as a condition to 
employment or promotion, and the employer may not use genetic information to 
classify current employees in a manner that deprives employees of equal promotion 
opportunities."59) And also under the Order, "[e]mployees cannot be denied 
oversea posts or promotion opportunities based on information regarding genetic 
susceptibility to certain disease."60) 
  However, there are many exceptions to the above proscriptions: "(1) department 
or agency health offices may collect genetic information about employees that use 
the department or agency health services and (2) genetic monitoring of employees 
is allowed."61) Zindorf explains that "[u]nlike genetic screening, which tests the 
potential of an individual developing a future disorder, genetic monitoring 
determines to what degree a person has been exposed to or harmed by toxins."62) 
Moreover, Zindorf states that "[u]nlike the ADA, the Executive Order does not 
permit employers to prescreen individuals if the test is job-related and consistent 
with business necessity. Additionally, "certain exceptions permit disclosure to 
select individuals, including: the employee, officials investigating compliance with 
the order, health researchers involved in researching human subjects, the court and 
as required by law."63) 
  Diver and Cohen also note that "[Ijike the ADA, the Order contains several 
exceptions, including the use of genetic information at the pre-placement stage." 
For example, "[t]he Order permits federal employers to consider genetic 
information 'to assess whether further medical evaluation is needed to diagnose a 
current disease, or medical condition or disorder'."64) They also note that
58) Id. 6878-79 § 1-202 (a)-(e). 
59) Natalie E. Zindorf, Comment, Discrimination in the 21st Centurv: Protecting the Privac•y of 
   Genetic Information in Employment and Insurance, 36 TULSA L.J. 703, 713 (2001). 
60) Id. 
61) Id. 
62) Id. 
63) Id. at 714. 
64) Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, supra note 19, at 1451 n44 (quoting Exec. Order No.
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"significantly
, moreover, it permits employees considerable latitude with respect o 
information they wish to voluntarily disclose."65) For instance, "[t]he Order 
permits federal employees to authorize their employers to use genetic information 
obtained in connection with genetic or health care services provided by the 
employing agency."66) 
  As has been seen, the Executive Order proscription has many exceptions and 
also it bans genetic discrimination only in the federal employment context and 
leaves employees on the state level or in private sectors unprotected.
             c. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
  As mentioned before, so far there has been no federal genetic-specific 
antidiscrimination law enacted in the employment arena nor in the insurance field. 
And also there is currently no case law precisely addressed over the issue of 
whether the individuals with asymptomatic genetic disorders would be protected 
against genetic discrimination in the workplace. Under this circumstance, the 
federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has been regarded by many 
commentators as the most promising federal level legal legislation which 
potentially provides legal protection against genetic discrimination in the 
workplace.67) In this subsection, I review the ADA provisions and consider to 
what extent the ADA can give legal protection to job applicants and employees 
against genetic discrimination. At the saure time, I address everal insufficiencies 
of the ADA in regards to protecting job applicants and workers from genetic 
discrimination by referring to several arguments presented by commentators who 
have examined this issue seriously. Moreover, I introduce a proposed amendment 
presented by a scholar. And then, I review the state-level genetic-specific statutes 
which try to make up for the insufficiencies and fill the legal loopholes of the 
federal evel legal protections in employment.
L Applicability (Establishing an ADA Claim): Qualified Individual with a 
 Disability 
  The ADA was enacted in 1990 and became ffective on July 26, 1992, aiming to
   13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000) § 1-301 (a)(2), ai 6879)). 
65) Id. ai 1451. 
66) Id. n44 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000) § 1-301 (b)(2), ai 
  6877)). 
67) E.g. Kaufmann states that "[t]he ADA potentially provides employees the greatest protection 
   against genetic discrimination." Melinda B. Kaufmann, infra note 74, ai 404.
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prohibit employers from discriminating against job applicants and employees with 
disabilities (without the intention of banning genetic discrimination). It applies to 
all employers with fifteen or more employees regardless of whether the employer is 
the federal government or private sectors which do not receive federal funding.
(1) Scholarly Interpretation: Three Prongs of the Definition of Disability 
  Title I of the ADA states that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in 
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terras, conditions, and 
privileges of employment."68) 
  The ADA does not specifically address genetic discrimination. Therefore, the 
first controversial issue that needs to be discussed is whether an individual with an 
unexpressed genetic condition (presymptomatic or predisposed to diseases or 
illnesses) is a "disability" under the definition of the ADA. The answer ests on the 
interpretation of the provisions of the ADA. Indeed, by interpreting the provision 
of the ADA as to include people with genetic abnormality in the definition of an 
individual with "a disability", the ADA has been regarded the most prospective 
legal protection presently offered on the federal evel against genetic discrimination 
in the workplace. 
  To establish a discrimination daim under the ADA, an applicant or employee 
must show that s/he is within at least one prong of the following three parts of the 
definition of an individual with a disability. Under the ADA, "disability" is defined 
as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) 
being regarded as having such an impairment."69) 
  The individuals with presymptomatic genetic illness or those genetically 
predisposed to disease might be seen as falling within (A) or at least within (C) the 
third "perception" prong of the definition of disability.70) "Physical or mental 
impairment" means "any physiological disorder or condition, disfigurement, or 
anatomical loss affecting any of the major body systems or any mental or
68) 42 U.S.C. §12112(a) (Supp. III 1991). 
69) 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(A)-(C). 
70) Amanda J. Wong, Comment, Distinguishing Speculative and Substantial Risk In the 
   Pres niptomatic Job Applicant:• Interpreting the Interpretation of the Americans with Disabilities 
   Act Direct Threat Defense, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1141 (2000).
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psychological disorder."711 Whether a disability is "substantially limiting" depends 
on "the nature and severity of the impairment, he duration or expected uration of 
the impairment, and the permanent or long-terni impact of the impairment."72) 
According to the regulations issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), "major life activity" includes activities such as "caring for 
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, 
learning, and working."73)
(1-a) First Prong of the Definition of "Disability"- Impairment Substan-
tially Limiting a Major Life Activity 
  According to Melinda B. Kaufmann, "[m]ost genetic disorders do not exhibit 
present symptoms that would qualify as 'substantially limiting a major life 
function."'74) She notes:
First, this section would not apply to an individual whose genetic defect 
has not yet become a physical disorder, but may become one in the 
future. Second, this section does not protect an individual who may be a 
carrier for a disease that will never manifest itself in the individual, but 
may appear in his or her offspring. Finally, the section does not protect a 
person who may have a disabling disorder that is under treatment, but 
manifesta no physical symptoms. 75)
  Hence, she concludes that "[e]mployees in any of these three categories would 
not be protected under section (A) of the ADA because their 'disability' does not 
currently affect `a major life function."'76) 
  However, Deborah Gridley analyzes the provisions of the ADA and 
demonstrates that a genetic marker for disease qualifies as a disability under either 
the first or third prong of the disability definition. She asserts that the first prong 
also can be interpreted as to include genetic predispositions for disease in the scope 
of the disability defined under the ADA. She notes that "[a] genetic disorder that
71) Deborah Gridley, Genetic Testing Under the ADA: A Case .for Protection From Employment 
   Discrimination, 89 GEO. L. J. 973, 983-84 (2001) (referring to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2000)). 
72) 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). 
73) 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2000). 
74) Melinda B. Kaufmann, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace: An Overview of Existing 
   Protections, 30 Loy. U. CHi. L. J. 393, 411 (1999). 
75) Id. 
76) Id.
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does not exhibit present symptoms would not seem to qualify as an impairment that 
`substantially limits' any ` major life function."'771 However, by referring to the 
majority opinion in Bragdon v. Abbott discussed later, she argues that "by using an 
analogy to persons with HIV, it seems that in some cases a genetic marker for 
disease should be considered a disability under this prong of the ADA's 
definition."78)
A person with HIV may live for years with no symptoms at all, yet she is 
still impaired; likewise, a person with a genetic condition may be 
asymptomatic for some time, but still possess the impairment of the 
genetic marker. Thus, a person with a genetic marker for disease should 
be considered "impaired" for ADA purposes.79)
  As Gridley admits, "a person who is a mere carrier and will never develop the 
genetic disease could not be considered impaired in this context [first prong]." 80] 
She states that "such a defect would not actually be the 'beginning of a genetic 
disease process,' but rather a genetic flaw that does no real harm to the individual 
and will never manifest itself in any way."81) She concludes that
to the extent that a perron is not a mere carrier but is someone who will 
at some point develop the disease in the future, she may be considered 
impaired under the first prong of the Act because she possesses a defect 
which is the "beginning of a genetic disease process."82)
  Brian R. Gin also draws "an analogy between individuals infected with HIV and 
individuals affected by Huntington's disease,"83) and argues that "Huntington's 
individuals are protected by the Act [ADA] as persons with a disability, either as 
individuals with an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, or as 
individuals regarded as having such an impairment."841
77) Deborah Gridley, supra note 71, at 983. 
78) Id. 
79) Id. at 984. 
80) Id. at 984-85. 
81) Id. at 985. 
82) Id. 
83) Brian R. Gin, Note: Genetic Discrimination: Huntington's Diseuse and the Anverican waith 
   Disabifities Act, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1406, 1408 (1997). 
84) Id (emphasis added).
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(1-b) Second Prong of the Definition of "Disability"-Record of Impairment 
  Gridley notes that "[t]his provision is designed to protect individuals who have 
recovered from a disability as well as those who were misdiagnosed in the part as 
having a disability."85) She notes that "[i]t may be argued that a `record' of an 
impairment may include a `record' of a future, rather than past, impairment as 
indicated by a genetic test showing a likelihood of developing a certain disease."86) 
However, she argues that "this view fends little support in either scholarly views or 
legislative history"87) and also "the EEOC regulations do not mention future 
impairment as included under this prong of the ADA's definition,"88) and therefore 
"this definition of disability does not include any kind of record of future 
impairment."89) 
  However, Kaufmann notes that "[t]his prong may have ramifications for 
individuals who incorrectly test positive for a genetic disorder, an outcome that is 
highly likely given the inaccuracies and inconsistencies of current genetic tests."90) 
  Accordingly, the second prong-"Record of Impairment" is relevanto genetic 
disorder as long as individuals have recovered from a genetic disease, such as 
Phenylketonuria91) or mistakenly regarded as having a genetic disease, for example, 
due to inaccurate genetic tests. In general, virtually all commentators who try to 
find legal protection for individuals with genetic abnormalities under the ADA rest 
on the third prong.
1-c) Third Prong of the Definition of "Disability"-Regarded as Having 
    Impairment 
  Gridley states that "[i]ndividuals who do not fit within the actual disability 
prong [first and second definitions] of the ADA but who are nevertheless 
discriminated against on the basic of a genetic defect can find protection as 
individuals 'regarded as' having an impairment."92) Gridley addresses the purpose 
of enacting the ADA; "the ADA was intended to protect disabled individuals, who
85) Deborah Gridley, supra note 71, at 988. 
86) Id. 
87) Id. 
88) Id. 
89) Id. 
90) Melinda B. Kaufmann, supra note 74, at 412. 
91) Phenylketonuria is treatable genetic disease. It is "a genetic disorder that can cause mental 
   retardation [only] if the infant is net treated soon after birth." Lori Andrews, Genetics. 
   reproduction, and the Law, 35-JUL TRIAI 24 (1999). 
92) Deborah Gridley, supra note 71, at 988.
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had historically been victims of purposeful unequal treatment because they possess 
characteristics that are beyond their control and that are not truly indicative of each 
individual's ability to participate in, and contribute to, society."93) She quotes a 
statement of Congress; -unnecessary discrimination denies people with disabilities 
the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for 
which our free society is justifiably famous."'94) And she argues that "[f]or 
purposes of the Act [ADA], an employee is disabled when her employer egards her 
as having a substantially limiting impairment, whether or not she is actually 
limited."95) 
  The ADA defines "Regarded as having an impairment" as having:
(1) . . . a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit 
major life activities but is treated by [an employer] as constituting such 
limitation; (2) . . . a physical or mental impairment hat substantially 
limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others 
toward such impairment; or (3) ... none of the impairments [specifically 
stated by the EEOC] but [[being] treated by [an employer] as having a 
substantially imiting impairment.96)
Therefore, for example, Gridley argues that
an employee who is discriminated against on the basis of a genetic 
marker that does exist but that bas not manifested itself in any disease 
will also find coverage under the Act as a person regarded as disabled by 
the employer, even though the employee does not yet have an actual 
disability.97)
  Accordingly, she concludes that "an employee who is denied employment on 
the basis of a genetic marker falls under the 'regarded as' prong of the Act and may 
be protected from such discrimination, even if the defect is not severe enough to 
place her within the protection of the 'actual disability' prong."98)
93) Id. at 981. 
94) Id. at 981 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(9) (2000)). 
95) Id. at 988-89. 
96) Brian R. Gin, supra note 83, at 1430 (alteration in original, emphases added, quoting 29 C.F.R. § 
  1630.2(1)). 
97) Deborah Gridley, supra note 71, at 989. 
98) Id. at 992.
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  Kaufmann also argues that "[t]he third prong, subsection (C), is the employee's 
greatest protection against genetic discrimination." 99) She notes that "[u]nlike the 
other disability categories [prongs], this section is based on the employer's 
perceptions, not the existence of a true disability or even the individual's own 
perception of himself or herself as disabled."10(» Kaufmann concludes that 
"[i]ndividuals with asymptomatic genetic disorders, therefore
, would most likely be 
covered by this section because employers would be discriminating based on the 
presence of a genetic anomaly, not on the employee's inability to perform [the 
job] "101) 
  Jennifer S. Geetter states that this third "prong provides protection to an 
individual if she can show that (1) while she had a physical or mental impairment, it
did not substantially limit her ability to perform major life activities, or 
alternatively, that (2) she did not suffer at all from a statutorily prescribed physical 
or mental impairment."102) However, Geetter notes "the applicability of the third 
prong may vary widely depending on the nature of the genetic abnormality, the 
likelihood of expression and the victim of expression (the individual or his/her 
child)." 103) 
  Brian R. Gin also notes that although Huntington's disease, a typical 
monogenetic disorder which will be manifested with almost certainty, is covered by 
the third prong, other genetic disorders may not be regarded as having an 
impairment because of the uncertainty of the time and severity of manifesting 
diseases. 104)
(2) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Compliance Manual 
  (policy guideline) 
  In 1995,the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal 
agency charged with enforcing federal workplace anti-discrimination laws, issued a 
Compliance Manual (policy guideline).105) In this Manual, the issue of whether
99) Melinda B. Kaufmann, supra note 74, at 412. 
100) Id. at 413. 
101) Id. at 413. 
102) Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding.fbr Change: The Power of the Human Genonte to Transforni the 
    Anierican Health Insurance Svstenm. 28 AM. J.L. & Meo. 1, 43 (2002). 
103) Id. 
104) Brian R. Gin, supra note 83, at 1431-32. 
105) According to Paul Steven Miller, Commissioner U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission, EEOC 
   was created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. And in 1972, title VII was amended to 
    give the EEOC broad authority to file lawsuits against private employers, labor unions and
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individuals with unexpressed, late on-set genetic disorders are in the scope of the 
terra "qualified individual with a disability" under the provision of the ADA is 
addressed.106) It is stated that the ADA
applies toi individuals who are subjected to discrimination on the basis of 
genetic information relating to illness, disease, or other disorders. 
Covered entities that discriminate against individuals on the basis of such 
genetic information are regarding the individuals as having impairments 
that substantially imit a major life activity. Those individuals, therefore, 
are covered by the third part of the definition of "disability".107)
The manual gives a hypothetical example to clarify the above statement:
CP[charging party]'s genetic profile reveals an increased susceptibility to 
colon cancer. CP is currently asymptomatic and may never in fact 
develop colon cancer. After making CP a conditional offer of 
employment, R[one particular employer] learns about CP's increased 
susceptibility to colon cancer. R then withdraws the job offer because of 
concerns about matters such as CP's productivity, insurance costs, and 
attendance. R is treating CP as having an impairment hat substantially 
limits a major life activity. Accordingly, CP is covered by the third part 
of the definition of "disability". 108)
  Melinda B. Kaufmann asserts that this "statement better illustrates the modem 
ADA interpretation. If the intent behind the law [ADA] is to protect individuals 
from the myths and fears of society, it should apply to individuals with genetic
    employment agencies. Paul Steven Miller, The EEOC's Enfbrcement of thé ADA in the Second 
    Circuit, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1577, 1587 (1998). Miller explains the rote of the EEOC and 
    states that "[t]he EEOC's mission is to eliminate discrimination in the workplace based upon an 
    individual's disability, race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or age. The EEOC fulfills this 
    mandate by investigating charges of discrimination, initiating litigation on behalf of individuals, 
    and interviewing in private litigation." Id. at 1587-88. 
106) EEOC Conipliance Manual, vol. 2, EEOC Order 915.002, reprinted in Dail), Labor Report, Mar. 
    16, 1995, at E-1, E-23, 2 EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH), § 902.8(a) 16880, at 5303 (Mar. 
    14, 1995); Paul Steven Miller, EEOC Conipliance Manual, Exécutive Sumniary: Compliance 
   Manual Section 902, Definition of the Terni "Disability ", 562 PLI/LIT 249, 301 (1997). 
107) Id. (emphases added). 
108) Id. Also see, Paul Steven Miller, supra note 106, at 301.
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disorders as well as other types of asymptomatic diseases."109)
  Paul Steven Miller, Commissioner of U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission, 
notes that the EEOC "adopted policy guidance stating that the ADA prohibits 
discrimination against workers based on their genetic make-up."110) And "[t]his 
policy guidance xplicitly states that the third part of the definition of disability, the 
`regarded as' prong
, covers individuals who are subjected to discrimination on the 
basis of genetic preposition to illness, disease, or other disorder, even if the 
disability has not yet manifested."111) Accordingly, "employers who discriminate 
against individuals on such a basis are regarding the individuals as having 
impairments that substantially limit a major life activity and therefore are violating 
the ADA."112) Miller emphasizes that "EEOC's position is clear that the ADA 
protects individuals with asymptomatic genetic conditions from discrimination in 
employment, and the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance is used to interpret he law and 
can be used as persuasive authority."113)
(3) Judicial Responses: Bragdon v. Abbott (1998) 
  Although EEOC is a federal agency whichwas given the task to interpret and 
implement federal workplace anti-discrimination laws and is given deference, 
EEOC policy guidelines do not have the force of law. To this date, the Court has 
not been forced to answer the very issue of whether individuals with asymptomatic 
genetic disease or predisposed to genetic illness are included in the terra "qualified 
individual with disability" under the ADA. Thus, it is not clear whether the court 
will adopt he interpretation set forth by EEOC guidelines. However, several case 
decisions have been seen as providing guidance on the issue at question. 
  In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court held that asymptomatic HIV was a 
disability that substantially limited a major life activity.114) This case addressed 
asymptomatic HIV, not genetic predisposition. However, this five-to-four-decision 
has been read by some commentators as suggesting that a genetic predisposition 
could be seen as a disability. It might be argued that "having a genetic 
predisposition to certain disorders could adversely affect an individual's decision to
109) Melinda B. Kaufmann, supra note 74, at 414. 
110) Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 
    3 J. HEALTH CARF L. & POL'Y 225, 239 (2000). 
111) Id. 
112) Id. 
113) Id. at 241. 
114) Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 188 S.Ct. 2196 (1998).
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reproduce for fear of passing on the Bene mutation to the individual's offspring. 
Thus, the Bragdon Court's reasoning would protect individuals from discrimination 
on the basis of those genetic markers."115) 
  Indeed, before Bragdon,some commentators had already argued that the ADA 
could be interpreted as protecting qualified individuals with disability. For 
instance, Frances H. Miller and Philip A. Huvos argued that the ADA could be read 
to cover asymptomatic ndividuals who possess genetic disorders."6) Brian R. Gin 
also pointed out the shared similarity between presymptomatic Huntington's 
individuals (a typical genetic disease caused by a single dominant gene defect) and 
HIV-positive status and argued that Huntington's individuals hould be afforded the 
protection of the ADA for the same reasons that HIV-positive persons are 
protected.117) 
  Bragdon gave hope to the commentators trying to interpret he ADA as to 
encompass the asymptomatic genetic condition in its phrase "disability." However, 
there are scholarly opinions which raise serious doubts as to whether the Court 
would include presymptomatic or asymptomatic genetic information under the 
ADA. One of such analyses is presented by Laura E. Rothstein. By quoting the 
long reasoning in the Court opinion, L. Rothstein analyzes that "Bragdon provides 
little assurance that the ADA adequately protects individuals with genetic 
predispositions against discrimination."' 18) Furthermore, after detailed analyses of 
Bragdon and several subsequent court decisions, she states that "[b]ased on 
Sutton,119) Murphy,120) and Albertsons,121) combined with Bragdon, any attempt o 
assert that a particular genetic predisposition is per se a disability entitled to 
statutory protection as interpreted by the Supreme Court is highly questionable."122) 
Accordingly, L. Rothstein concludes that "the belief that Bragdon resolves the issue 
of genetic discrimination is not well founded" and therefore, she argues that "it 
would be much better to provide additional statutory protection to ensure consistent
115) Laura E. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination: Why Bragdon Does Not Ensure Protection, 3 
    HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 330, 338 (2000). 
116) Frances H. Miller & Philip A. Huvos, Genetic Blueprints, Employer Cost-Cutting, and the 
   American with Disabilities Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 369, 375-77 (1994). 
117) Brian R. Gin, supra note 83, at 1406. 
118) Laura E. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination: Why Bragdon Does Not Ensure Protection, 3 
    HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 330,344 (2000). 
119) Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999). 
120) Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999). 
121) Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999). 
122) Id. at 350.
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application of the ADA to genetic discrimination." 123) 
  Moreover, in Bragdon v. Abbott, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion 
which was joined by Justice Scalia and Thomas suggests that asymptomatic genetic 
disease and predisposed to genetic illness are not covered under the ADA. 124) 
Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority opinion which held that 
asymptomatic HIV is a disability under the ADA, and argued that
the ADA's definition of a disability is met only if the alleged impairment 
substantially "limits" (present ense) a major life activity. Asymptomatic 
HIV does not presently limit respondent's ability to perform any of the 
tasks necessary to bear or raise a child. Respondent's argument, aken to 
its logical extreme, would render every individual with a genetic marker 
for some debilitating disease "disabled" here and now because of some 
possible future effects.125)
  Zindorf notes that "in Bragdon v. Abbott, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting 
opinion suggests that the Supreme Court justices might be reluctant to define 
individuals with genetic alterations as disabled under the meaning of the ADA."126) 
Gulati also cites Paul Steven Miller's statement, in footnote 202; "three of the 
justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, have already 
voiced their opinion that genetic predispositions to disease would not be covered 
under the ADA."127) P. Miller states that "Justice Rehnquist's comments raise the 
question whether he would reject outright he ADA's protection of individuals with 
asymptomatic genetic conditions, or whether he would accept coverage under a 
major life activity theory other than reproduction, such as working."128) L. 
Rothstein also notes that in Bragdon, in his dissenting opinion "Chief Justice 
Rehnquist took the position that while asymptomatic HIV-positive status is a 
physical impairment, it is questionable whether eproduction is a major life activity. 
Even if reproduction is a major life activity, Justice Rehnquist would hold that HIV
123) Id. at 331. 
124) Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 188 S.Ct. 2196 (1998). 
125) Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 661, 188 S.Ct. 2196, 2216 (1998) (citation omitted) (emphasis 
   added). 
126) Natalie E. Zindorf, Comment, Discrimination in the 21st Centur'• Protecting the Privaci' of 
    Genetic Information in Employment and Insurance, 36 TULSA L.J. 703, 711-12 (2001). 
127) Chetan Gulati, supra note 46, at 203 n202 (citing Paul Steven Miller, Commissioner U.S. Equal 
    Opportunity Commission, Federal News Service, July 20, 2000)). 
128) Paul Steven Miller, supra note 110, at 245.
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infection does not substantially lirait that activity.»129) 
  As has been seen, at present the court position is not clear with regard to the 
issue of whether or not asymptomatic genetic disease and predisposed to genetic 
illness can be covered by the phrase "qualified individual with disability" under the 
ADA.
ii. Obtaining Genetic Information Under the ADA: Genetic Tests 
  In this subsection, I will review the restrictions under the ADA on employers' 
obtaining genetic information of the job applicants and current employees.
(1) Genetic Tests: Genetic Screening and Genetic Monitoring 
  In general,c genetic tests are categorized into twotypes: genetic screening and 
genetic monitoring. According to Melinda B. Kaufmann, genetic screening is"a 
one-time t st performed on job applicants in order to determine their current genetic 
predisposition."130) Andthere are two methods in genetic screening: Biomedical 
genetic screening and direct-DNA screening. The former method "consists of the 
analysis of mutant genes based on altered proteins or enzymes in the individual's 
bloodstream" and the latter method "involves the direct examination of the 
individual's DNA."131) Genetic monitoring tests "involve periodic testing of 
individuals to evaluate any modifications that may have occurred in their genetic 
material. .. Reasons given to conduct genetic monitoring include: identifying risks 
associated with certain toxins, targeting work areas for increased safety, and 
identifying previously unknown workplace toxins."132) 
  Kaufmann notes the employers' rationale to perform genetic testing and have 
access te, the genetic information of job applicants and workers:
[A]s employers increasingly provide health benefits to workers, genetic 
and medical screening may be used to weed out job applicants or 
workers who are likely to have higher insurance costs. In addition, 
employers may be interested in decreasing the costs associated with 
occupational illnesses by eliminating workers with a genetic 
predisposition to those diseases.133)
129) Laura E. Rothstein, supra note 118, at 347. 
130) Melinda B. Kaufmann, supra note 74, at 397. 
131) Id. at 398. 
132) Id. at 398-99. 
133) Id. at 398.
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  Sharona Hoffman notes that "[glenetic testing has been described as a 'fast-
moving gold rush' into which employers, among others, are 'trying to sink in 
stakes.' The rapid development of genetic testing capabilities is raising profound 
concern about genetic privacy and discrimination."134 According to one source, 
"[g]enetic tests are currently available for more than 400 diseases, and tests for over 
300 others are being developed. `More than 175,000 genetic tests were performed 
in 1996,' and it is estimated that throughout he mid-1990s there was an annual 
thirty percent increase in the use of genetic testing."135) 
  Hoffman notes that "in 1994, DNA testing cost between $50 and $900 per test. 
It was estimated that with automation and the prolifération of genetic testing, costs 
could significantly diminish to a price of $50 to $150 for a panel of six or more 
DNA tests." 136) However, she also notes that "commentators have noted that the 
patenting and licensing of genetic tests may increase the costs of genetic testing and 
that the need for interpretation, education, and genetic counseling relating to such 
tests may further raise their overall cost."137) Hoffman also notes that "[i]n the 
future, multiplex testing will also be available. Multiplex screening will allow for 
multiple genetic tests on a single blood or tissue sample to identify disease, carrier 
status, and susceptibility all at the same time. In some cases, DNA chips will be 
utilized to analyze thousands of genes simultaneously."138) 
  However, it should be noted that "[g]enetic testing often predicts nothing about 
a person's ability to perform a job at the tune he or she is hired. In many cases, it 
can at most predict the likelihood that a person will develop a disease in the future 
or will have a child with a particular disease."139) 
  At any rate, given the fact that asthe cost of performing genetic tests decreases 
and tests become more accurate and automated and that employers have strong 
economic incentives to have access to the genetic information of job applicants and 
employers to screen out the individuals who may incur future insurance costs and 
compensation damage, employers will have stronger incentives to utilize genetic
134) Sharona Hoffman, Preplacement Exantinations and Job-Relatedness: Hom, to Enhance Privacy 
    and Diminish Discrimination in the Workplace, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 517, 532 (2001). 
135) Id. at 534 (numbers are cited from Rick Weiss, Ignorance Undercuts Gene Tests' Potential, 
    WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2000, at A01.). 
136) Id. at 535 (data are based on ASSESSING ENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL 
    POLICY 235 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994)). 
137) Id. (data are based on ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 235 
    (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994)). 
138) Id. 
139) Id.
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tests. 
  Generally, the ADA bans or restricts employers' obtaining or having access to 
the genetic information of job applicants or current employees through medical 
examinations performed in the following three différent stages of the employment 
process: pre-employment medical examination of the job applicants; post-offer 
medical examination of conditional offerees; and periodic medical examination of 
the current employees.
(2) Pre-employment Testing (Medical Examination) of Job Applicants 
  At this stage, all medical examinations and medical inquiries are illegal under 
the ADA unless inquiries are relevant o the ability of a job applicant o perform 
job-related functions.140) It is prescribed that "[a] covered entity shall not conduct a 
medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such 
applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such 
disability."141) 
  Frances H. Miller & Philip A. Huvos note that "the ADA makes it unlawful for 
an employer to require a job applicant to submit to a pre-employment medical 
examination. Nor may an employer ask an applicant whether he has a disability or 
about he nature or severity of an apparent one."142) 
  According to the commentary made byRothstein,
This provision is significant because preemployment medical 
examinations have been used since the turn of the century and remain in 
widespread use today throughout he country. Nearly ninety percent of 
applicants for jobs at large plants-more than 500 workers- and over 
fifty percent of applicants for jobs at smaller plants-fewer than 500 
workers- are subject to preemployment examinations. It is no longer 
lawful for employers to immediately exclude "generally unhealthy" 
applicants from all possible jobs in the application process.143)
140) 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(2) (A)-(B) (West Supp. 1992). 
141) 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1992). 
142) Frances H. Miller & Philip A. Huvos, Genetic Blueprints, Employer Cost-Cutting, and the 
    American with Disabilities Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 369, 378 (1994) (referring to 42 U.S.C. 
   §12112(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 111 991)). 
143) Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Entployment and the Americans Disabilities Act, 
    29 HOUSTON L. REV. 23, 52-53 (1992).
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  Rothstein goes on to comment hat "[w]ith regard to genetic-related inquiries, a 
wide range of employer queries will no longer be lawful. For example, job 
applicants may not be asked about their past, current, or future genetic conditions, 
the health histories of family members, or the genetic health conditions of 
associates." 144) 
  MelindaB. Kaufmann also comments on the reason why genetic tests at this 
stage are prohibited under the ADA:
Only testing reveals the existence of a genetic marker in the individual, 
therefore, the individual who is unaware of his or lier genetic condition 
cannot answer questions about the unknown. Even if an individual had 
knowledge of a genetic disorder, an inquiry into whether an individual 
could perform basic job functions would be irrelevant in most cases of 
latent genetic disorders because the disorder would have no discernible 
effect on the employee's ability to perform the job at the present 
moment. 145)
  However, even though genetic testing and inquiry about genetic information are 
prohibited at the pre-employment stage, employers can obtain virtually all of the 
genetic information in the next stage discussed below.
(3) Pre-placement Testing (Entrance Examination) after Conditional Job 
  Offer 
  Contrary to the pre-employment and before job offer stage discussed above, at 
the pre-placement s age in which a conditional offer is made but employment has 
not yet started, the ADA allows employers to perform genetic testing and obtain the 
genetic information of the job applicants. 
  The ADA provides that "[a] covered entity may require a medical examination 
after an offer of employment has been made to a job applicant and prior to the 
commencement of the employment duties of such applicant, and may condition an 
offer of employment on the results of such examination."146) 
  According to the commentary made by Miller and Huvos, under the ADA, as
144) Id. at 53. 
145) Melinda B. Kaufmann, supra note 74, at 407. 
146) 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3); sec also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) ("A covered entity may require a 
    medical examination ... after making an offer of employment ... and may condition an offer of 
    employment on the results of such examination.").
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has been seen above, "an employer discovering a prospective mployee's disability 
upon medical examination is barred from withdrawing a job offer for that reason 
alone; unless the disability impairs job fitness and reasonable accommodation 
would create undue hardship for the business, an employer cannot withdraw the 
offer."147) 
  Kaufmann points out that "[t]his section [] does not restrict he purpose behind 
the test, so an employer may theoretically test for any médical condition." 148) 
  However, these examinations must satisfy three requirements. First, an 
employer must test all entering employees regardless of disability. 149) Second, the 
information collected must be maintained on separate forms and in a separate 
medical file and treated as confidential.150) Third, the results of the medical 
examination may be used only in accordance with this subchapter.' 51) 
  According to the commentary made by Rothstein, the first requirement means 
that "an employer can require examinations only of loading dock employees, but 
canne require examinations of only those applicants who have, or who are 
regarded as having, disabilities." 152) 
  According to Rothstein, the second requirement means:
This information must be treated as confidential, except that supervisors 
and managers may be informed regarding necessary restrictions on the 
work or duties of the employee and necessary accommodations;"') first 
aid and safety personnel may be informed if the disability might require 
emergency treatment;154) and government officials investigating 
compliance with the ADA must be provided with relevant information 
on request.155)
With regard to the third requirement, Rothstein comments:
147) Frances H. Miller & Philip A. Huvos, Genetic Blueprints, Employer Cost-Cutting, and the 
   Anierican with Disabilities Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 369, 379 (1994) (emphases added). 
148) Melinda B. Kaufmann, supra note 74, at 408. 
149) 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b). 
150) 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(1). 
151) 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(C). 
152) 56 Fed.Reg. 8601. 
153) 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1992). 
154) 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(3)(B)(ii) (West Supp.1992). 
155) 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (iii) (West Supp. 1992).
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Of particular elevance is section 102(b)(6), which prohibits employers 
from using "selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an 
individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities 
unless the . . . criteria are shown to be job-related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity." 156) In other words, if a 
conditional offer of employment is withdrawn based on an employment 
entrance examination, the only permissible reason for doing so is the 
individual's inability, even with reasonable accommodation, to perform 
the essential requirements of the job. 157)
   Kaufmann also notes "[y]et, the third requirement under the ADA provides 
protection against discrimination, 158) which means that while the employer can test 
for anything, he cannot then use the test results to discriminate against the 
employee or applicant in violation of the ADA."159) 
  Rothstein observes that "[t]he only issue left unclear in the language of the ADA 
is whether the actual examinations given to conditional offerees must be job-
related."160) 
  At this pre-placement stage, that is, after conditional job offer is made, the 
EEOC regulations tate that "post-offer employment entrance xaminations `do not 
have to be job-related and consistent with business necessity."161)
Rothstein examines the implication of the EEOC regulations and states:
The preceding regulation has grave implications for genetic 
discrimination and deserves careful review. Pursuant to the regulation, 
employers may require, as a condition of employment, that individuals 
accede to medical examinations, including genetic testing, but these 
results may not be used for screening purposes.162) Under these
156) 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(6) (West Supp. 1992). 
157) Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the Aniericans Disabilities Act, 
    29 HOUSTON L. REV. 23, 55 (1992) (referring to Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals 
   with Disabilities 56 Fed.Reg. 35,726 app. at 35,751 (1991». 
158) Melinda B. Kaufmann, supra note 74, at 408(1999) (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(C); 
   see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3)). 
159) Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6». 
160) Mark A. Rothstein, supra note 157, at 55. 
161) Equal Employment Opportunity.for Individuals with Disabilities 56 Fed.Reg. 35,726 app. at 
   35,751 (1991). 
162) Id.
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circumstances, permitting non job-related genetic testing may lead to 
discrimination and other harms. 163)
Rothstein criticizes the EEOC regulations and argues:
In theory, the regulation prohibits discrimination by proscribing the use 
of non job-related medical examinations for screening purposes.164) Even 
if the test results are never used, however, serious problems arise from 
allowing non job-related medical examinations. The ADA has other 
objectives besides prohibiting discrimination, including promoting 
autonomy and protecting the privacy and dignity of individuals with 
disabilities.165) Specifically, one of the ADA's statutory goals is to 
prevent the compelled disclosure of non job-related medical 
information. 166) As the Senate Committee Report noted with regard te, 
cancer: "The individual with cancer may object merely to being 
identified, independent of the consequences because ... being identified 
as disabled often carries both blatant and subtle stigma." 167) Throughout
the statute, Congress adopted the policy of prohibiting employer access 
to nonessential medical information. 168) Only in section 102(d)(3), as 
interpreted by the EEOC, has Congress permitted unrestricted employer 
access to wide-ranging medical information, with the ADA merely 
proscribing the discriminatory use of the information. 169)
Rothstein further argues:
[M]edical inquiries and examinations for workers' compensation and 
health insurance purposes are performed for reasons other than 
determining fitness to work or job placement. These examinations need 
not and should not, however, be performed on conditional offerees. They
163) Mark A. Rothstein, supra note 157, at 56. 
164) Id. (referring to 56 Fed.Reg. 35,737). 
165) Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(2) (West Supp. 1992)). 
166) Id. § 12112(d)(4). 
167) Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 
    1989, S.Rep. No. 116, 101 st Cong., l st Sess. 21 (1989). 
168) Id. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(1) (West Supp. 1992). 
169) Id. at 56-57 (Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed.Reg. 
   35,726).
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should be permitted only as post-employment procedures. At best, these 
examinations hould act as exceptions to section 102(d)(4) governing 
inquiries and examinations of current employees.170) With the current 
wording and interpretation of section 102(d)(3), however, employers 
may require any non job-related medical examination without first 
showing that it is required for baseline data collection, workers' 
compensation, health insurance, or another legitimate purpose.171) 
Granting employers the right to obtain non job-related medical 
information is, by itself, harmful and incongruous with the spirit of the 
ADA. Permitting these inquiries at a time when a conditional offer of 
employment may be withdrawn creates a real risk of health-based 
discrimination. 172)
  In sum, as has been seen, at the pre-placement s age, employers are allowed to 
perform genetic testing and obtain genetic information of the job applicants 
regardless of whether it is job-related and consistent with business necessity.
(4) Periodic Testing of Current Employees (During Employment) 
  At this stage, "[a]n employer cannot require an employee already on the job to 
submit o a medical examination or inquiry unless it 'is shown to bejob-related and 
consistent with business necessity."'173) However, "[a]n employer can acquire non-
job-related medical information, including the results of genetic testing, when 
workers offer it voluntarily."174) 
  Section 102(d)(4) of the ADA mandates medical examinations of current 
employees. It provides that employers
shah not require a medical examination and shah not make inquiries of 
an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a 
disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such 
examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with 
business necessity.'175)
170) 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(4) (West Supp 1992). 
171) 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(3) (West Supp. 1992). 
172) Mark A. R(Èhstein, supra note 157, at 61. 
173) Frances H_ Miller & Philip A. liuvos„ Genetic Blueprints, Employer Cost-Cutting, and the 
   Anreriean ia'ith Disabilities Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 369, 380 (1994) (emphases added). 
174) Id. 
175) 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1992) (emphases added).
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  Kaufmann notes that "[g]enetic screening would theoretically be legal if it were 
'directly related to qualifications for doing the task 
or if necessary for employee 
safety.' Job-relatedness, however, generally applies only to the employee's present 
capability to perform the job." 171) 
  According to the commentary made by Rothstein, "[m]ore comprehensive 
medical examinations are permissible only if they are voluntary. All medical 
information obtained about current employees must be treated as confidential. 
Thus, the information is subject to the saure protections as medical information 
obtained uring an employment entrante xamination."177) 
  Rothstein goes on to comment:
Under the ADA, periodic medical examinations of current employees 
must be job-related or voluntary. This requirement is another major 
change from the way in which occupational medicine is currently 
practiced in the United States. Nearly half of all employees and three-
quarters of all employees working in large plants-more than 500 
employees-are now subject to mandatory periodic medical 
examinations.178)
Kaufmann asserts:
It is doubtful that most genetic onditions, especially asymptomatic ones, 
would rise to the level of job-relatedness or business necessity so as to 
allow an employer to discriminate against applicants with the condition. 
An asymptomatic genetic disorder might have future ramifications, but 
would not affect the individual's present ability to perform his or lier job. 
An employer could rarely justify genetic screening based on job-
relatedness in order to overcome the ADA's protection. 179)
176) Melinda B. Kaufmann, supra note 74, at 409 (Quoting Charles B. Gurd, Whether a Genetic 
    Defect is a Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: PreventingGenetic 
    Discrimination fiv Employers, 1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 110 (1992); referring to 29 C.F.R. § 
   1630.10)). 
177) Mark A. Rothstein, supra note 157, at 61-62 (referring to 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(4)(B)-(C) 
   (West Supp. 1992)). 
178) Id. at 62. 
179) Melinda B. Kaufmann, supra note 74, at 409.
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  Kaufmann observes that "[o]verall ... employers are most likely to use genetic 
testing after a conditional job offer is made, but before the offer is finalized. 
Employers have a right to conduct medical or genetic tests at this stage in the hiring 
process."180) Therefore, she states that "[t]he issue becomes whether the employer 
can use the information gained from these tests to discriminate against workers with 
genetic defects."181)
In sum, Hoffman notes:
While the statute requires that any testing administered to existing 
employees be "job-related and consistent with business necessity," it 
does not similarly restrict the scope of preplacement tests and inquiries 
that are administered to job applicants. Consequently, medical 
examinations required of individuals who have received job offers but 
have not yet commenced their employment need not be job-related or 
justified by business necessity.182)
Hoffman argues that
employers hould be prohibited from conducting genetic testing that is 
not job-related and justified by business necessity. Under this standard, 
tests designed only to determine the likelihood that an individual will 
develop an illness at some point in the future would be prohibited. 
Genetic testing would be permitted only if it aims to identify present 
disease that could affect job performance. 183)
Hoffman further argues that
the différence between preplacement and postplacement examinations 
should be eliminated. Employers should be prohibited from conducting 
any testing that is not designed to reveal whether the potential employee
180) Id. 
181) Id. 
182) Sharona Hoffman, Preplacennent Exaniinations and Job-Relatedness: How to Enhance Privac.v 
    and Diniinish Discrimination in the Workplace, 49 U. KAN. L. Rev. 517, 519 (2001) (referring to 
   § 102(d)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A); § 102(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3); 29 C.F.R. § 
   1630.14(b)(3) (2000)). 
183) Id. at 559.
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can perform assigned job duties at the time of hiring. Moreover, medical 
data that is not relevant o job performance should never be accessible to 
employers.' 84)
  According to Hoffman, "[r]estricting preplacement medical testing would 
benefit both employees and employers."185) Hoffman states:
Medical testing that is not job-related constitutes an unjustifiable 
invasion of the examinee's privacy and creates temptations and 
opportunities for discrimination on the part of employers. Furthermore, 
individuals who undergo genetic testing and learn genetic information of 
which they were previously unaware may suffer significant 
psychological trauma if they do not receive appropriate counseling. For 
employers, medical examinations that are not job-related constitute an 
unnecessary financial expenditure and create a risk of litigation based on 
invasion of privacy, discrimination, and other theories. In addition, 
invasive medical testing can erode morale and productivity in the 
workplace.' 86)
   Moreover, as Miller and Huvos, and Rothstein point out, it also should be noted 
that to regulate the employers' acquisition of genetic information or gaining access 
to it during the three stages of medical examinations discussed above, is not 
sufficient enough to protect employees from genetic discrimination by employers. 
It should be noted that "[e]mployers can legitimately obtain genetic information 
through employee release of medical information necessary to process health 
insurance daims when the company self-insures, and through other voluntary 
examinations and wellness programs."187) Therefore, it is necessary to provide 
adequate legal regulations on the discriminatory use of genetic information of the 
employees. 
  As has been seen, under the ADA, employers can obtain genetic information of 
the job applicants and current employees legally under certain circumstances. 
Therefore, even if the ADA covers individuals with genetic abnormalities or 
predisposition to>genetic illnesses as -qualified individuals with disability, the ADA
184) Id. 
185) Id. at 520. 
186) Id. 
187) Frances H. Miller & Philip A. Huvos, supra note 173, at 381.
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safeguard against genetic discrimination is limited, given the fact that there is a 
loophole in blocking the employers' gaining access to the genetic information of 
the applicants or employees. This limited protection under the ADA is weakened 
more by the employer's defenses under the ADA that I will discuss later.
(5) Judicial Response: Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley 
  Laboratory (1998) 
  As has been seen, commentators have criticized the EEOC's regulations which 
interpret he provisions of the ADA as allowing employers to perform a wide range 
of medical tests at the pre-placement stage. In this subsection, I will review the 
judicial response to this issue. 
  The leading case where genetic testing in employment was addressed is the 
Ninth Circuit decision in Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory.188) 
The plaintiffs sued the Lawrence Berkeley. Laboratory, a government-funded 
research institution,189) challenging the employer's pre-placement medical tests 
conducted to some conditional offerees for syphilis, pregnancy, and sickle cell trait. 
Paul Steven Miller, a Commissioner of U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission, notes 
that "[t]he plaintiffs alleged that the genetic testing was conducted uring routine 
mandatory medical exams without the employees' knowledge or consent, and that 
the conditions for which testing was performed bore no relationship to the clerical 
and administrative jobs the employees had been hired to perform."190) 
  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's 
dismissal of these claims and held that "the employees alleged a valid constitutional 
daim for invasion of privacy at this governmental facility, as well as a valid Title 
VII daim for sex (pregnancy testing) and race (sickle cell testing) 
discrimination." 191) Miller notes:
The appellate court . . . found sufficient evidence in the record to
188) Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F. 3 1260 (9th Cir. 1998). 
189) Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory is a research institution- jointly operated by state and federal 
    agencies. Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J. L. MED. & ErHics 
    189, 192 (1998). The state, through the Regents of the University of California, operates 
    Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory under a contract with the Department of Energy (DOE). Becky 
    Risse, Privacl': Nonconsensual Testing of Emplol'ees for Medical and Genetic information. 24 
    AM. J.L. & MED. 131, 131 (1998). 
190) Paul Steven Miller, supra note 189, at 192. 
191) Mark A. Rothstein, Genetics and the Work.-Force of tlie Next Hundred Years, COLUM. Bus. L. 
   REV. 371, 386 (2000).
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conclude that testing for syphilis, sickle tell trait, and pregnancy is not 
an appropriate part of an occupational medical examination, that the 
employer lacked any reasonable basis for performing these tests on 
clerical and administrative employees uch as the plaintiffs, and that the 
performance of these tests, without explicit notice and informed consent, 
violates prevailing medical standards.192) ... The plaintiffs' Title VII 
daim [] was permitted to go forward, based on their daim that différent 
medical examinations were administered to African Americans (sickle 
tell trait) and women (pregnancy test), finding that such differential 
examinations constituted an "adverse ffect" sufficient o support a Title 
VII claim.193)
However, the Ninth Circuit court dismissed the ADA daims. Miller notes that
the court upheld the dismissal of the ADA daims on the following 
grounds: (1) that no job related action was taken against he plaintiffs as 
a result of the testing; (2) the Jack of evidence of inadequate safeguards 
to protect he confidentiality of the information; and (3) the scope of the 
exams did not violate the statute. 194)
  The Court states that "an employment entrance examination need not be 
concerned solely with the individual's 'ability to perform job-related functions,' nor 
must it be `job-related or consistent with business necessity.' Thus, the ADA 
imposes no restriction on the scope of entrante xaminations."195) 
  Although the Supreme Court has not yet specifically addressed the issue, the 
Circuit court decision affirms that medical examinations during the pre-placement 
stage under the ADA may be of unlimited scope. Consequently, the ADA gives 
employers an opportunity to have access to genetic information and therefore the 
ADA has a big loophole in regards to limiting the employers' access to genetic 
information. The limitation of the ADA is not only found in obtaining genetic 
information but also found in using it. The review in the next subsection will prove
192) Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F. 3 1260, 1267-68 (9th Cir. 1998). 
193) Paul Steven Miller, supra note 189, at 192 (referring to Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence 
   Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F. 3 1260, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 1998). 
194) Paul Steven Miller, supra note 110, at 253. 
195) Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F. 3 1260, 1273 (9th Cir. 1998) 
   (citations omitted) (emphases in original).
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the significant limitation of the ADA with 
genetic information in the workplace.
regard to banning discriminatory use of
iii. Employer's Defense Under the ADA: Undue Hardship and Direct Threat 
(1) Undue Hardship Defense 
  Even if a job applicant or current employee with any genetic disorder should be 
covered by the terra "disability" under the ADA, it does not per se mean that 
discrimination on the basis of genetic information always constitutes a violation of 
the ADA. Employers have two defenses to a claim of discrimination under the 
ADA: Undue Hardship and Direct Threat defenses. Gridley notes that 
"[d]iscrimination by an employer against an employee with a disability is not 
always a violation of the ADA. The interests of the employee are balanced against 
those of the employer to determine whether such discrimination will be 
allowed."196) 
  Under the ADA, "a reasonable accommodation must be provided to an 
otherwise qualified but disabled individual unless the employer 'can demonstrate 
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of 
business' of the employer." 197) Undue hardship is defined under the ADA as "an 
action requiring significant difficulty or expense."198) And also the Code of Federal 
Regulations defines undue hardship as "any accommodation that would be unduly 
costly, expensive, substantial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the 
nature or operation of the business."199) It means that "[e]mployers need not 
provide accommodations that would fundamentally alter the nature of the business. 
For example, a company need not stop producing batteries to eliminate levels of 
lead."20() According to the Code of Federal Regulations, "[t]he factors to be 
considered include (1) the nature and cost of the modification; (2) the overall 
financial resources of the facility: (3) the number of employees at the facility: (4) 
the overall financial resources of the entire company; (5) the type of operations of 
the company; and (6) the impact the accommodations would have on the operations
196) Deborah Gridley, supra note 71, ai 993. 
197) Melinda B. Kaufmann, supra note 74, ai 415 n.128 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §12112 (b)(5)(A) 
   (1995)(emphasis added). 
198) 42 U.S.C. §12111 (10)(A). 
199) 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) app. At 353-54 (1998). 
200) Deborah Gridley, supra note 71, ai 993 n152 (referring to Lawrence O. Gostin, Genetic 
    Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Emplopers 
    and Insurers, 17 AM. J. L. & ME'D. 109, 131 (1991)).
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at the facility."201) Therefore, "[t]he needs of the employee are compared with 
details such as the nature and the cost of the accommodation and the resources of 
the business."2021 Accordingly, "if the employer can demonstrate that 
accommodating the employee's disability would create an 'undue hardship' on the 
employer, then the employer's interests outweigh those of the employee, and the 
discriminatory action is not prohibited."203)
  Gridley states that "an employer may argue that the increased insurance colt 
associated with hiring individuals at heightened risk for disease constitutes a 
significant expense, one that outweighs an employee's interest and allows an 
employer to refuse to hire lier without violating the ADA."2041 Also it may be 
argued by employers that "the need to provide insurance for the employee should 
be considered an accommodation and that the possible future high expense of that 
accommodation is an undue hardship."205) However, Gridley argues that "the 
employer could reduce the effect of future costs by limiting the type of medical 
insurance available to employees, thus eliminating the hardship without any 
unwarranted discrimination. "206) So far, "the failure of an employer to 
accommodate a worker based on the potential economic costs of future illness has 
never been successfully raised by an employer as a defense to an ADA 
violation."207) Hence, it seems to be difficult to make an argument hat potential 
health insurance costs in the future incurred by employees with genetic 
predisposition to disease can constitute an undue hardship that justifies an employer 
in discriminating against hem. Accordingly, the employers' defense is more likely 
claimed, based on the direct threat defense.
(2) Direct Threat Defense 
  Gridley states that "[t]he ADA's `direct hreat' standard refers to the health or 
safety of other individuals in the workplace. An employer may discriminate against 
an individual with a disability if that person poses such a threat."208) And the 
decision made concerning direct threat "must be based upon scientific evidence;
201) Melinda B. Kaufmann, supra note 74, at 415 n130 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)). 
202) Deborah Gridley, supra note 71, at 993. 
203) Id. 
204) Id. at 994. 
205) Id. at 994-95. 
206) Id. at 955. 
207) Id. 
208) Deborah Gridley, supra note 71, at 995.
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irrational fears, speculation or stereotypes will not suffice."209) It means that "[a] 
specific determination must be made that a person with genetic predisposition will 
develop symptoms in the immediate future that represent a real threat to health or 
safety in the workplace."210) And also "[t]he determination must be made on a case 
by case basis through a fact-specific, individualized inquiry."211) In other words, 
"the evaluation of a direct threat must be done on a case-by-case basis, with real 
evidence and a fact-specific inquiry."212) Therefore, "[wlithout a determination that 
the person will develop symptoms in the immediate future that present a threat o 
others, discrimination is not allowed." However, Gridley notes that "[m]ost 
people with genetic markers for disease are not likely to pose a direct threat to the 
health or safety of others."213) This is because "[s]uch individuals have no current 
symptoms, and usually both the time of the disease's onset (or whether it will 
manifest itself at all) and its severity are impossible to predict."214) Thus, Gridley 
argues that "[g]eneral exclusion of large groups of people with genetic markers for 
disease on the basis of a direct threat is simply too speculative," and therefore, "use 
of this defense must be limited to those cases where it is clear that the individual 
does in fact pose a threat o the health or safety of others because of the manner in 
which the person's genetic disease bas begun to manifest itself."211) 
  Consequently, with regard to the people with genetic markers, the defense of 
direct threat to health or safety of others seems applicable only to limited types of 
genetic disorder such as genetic-link hypertension which may trigger sudden heurt 
attack or death,, and specific situations where the workplace at issue is a safety-
sensitive position such as public transportation drivers, airline pilots, police 
officers, and the like.
(3) EEOC's Regulations: Direct Threat to Self-Risk (Paternalistic 
   Employment Practice) 
  In July 1991, one year after the U.S. Congress passed the ADA, the EEOC, 
federal agency authorized to enforce and issue regulations implementing Title I of 
the ADA, issued its final rules in compliance with the ADA.216) The EEOC's rule
209) Id. 
210) Id. (quoting Lawrence O. Gostin, supra note 200, at 129-30). 
211) Id. (referring toLawrence O. Gostin, Id.) 
212) Id. 
213) Deborah Gridley, supra note 71, at 995. 
214) Id. 
215) Id. at 996. 
216) Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (July 26,
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interpreted irect threat defense paternalistically to include direct threat to the 
health and safety of the employee him/herself in addition to others.217) 
  As I mentioned before, the term "direct threat" is defined originally under the 
ADA as a "significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated 
by reasonable accommodation. "218) However, EEOC's rule expanded the meaning 
of the terni "direct threat" to those that pose "a significant risk of substantial harm 
to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or 
reduced by reasonable accommodation."219) 
  After reviewing in detail the legislative history and congressional intent of the 
ADA including House Judiciary Committee Report and House Labor Committee 
Report and also relevant case laws, Amanda J. Wong argues that the EEOC's 
interpretation of extending direct threat to self (in addition to "threat o others") is 
not only against he plain language of the direct threat provision of the ADA but 
also undermines the spirit and purpose behind the ADA. Wong states that "if direct 
threat is interpreted to encompass risk to self and others, . . . then, a loophole is 
created that allows employers to avoid potential iability by simply not hiring those 
who are at potential risk of injury or disease."220) She argues that EEOC's 
paternalistic interpretation "goes against he very spirit of the ADA, which sought 
from its inception to open opportunities for the disabled and allow them to compete 
on an equal, not favored, basis with the rest of society."221) Furthermore, she 
asserts that by allowing employers to take "direct threat o self' into consideration, 
EEOC's expanded interpretation results in the situation where "placing the decision 
in the hands of employers provides them with a means of avoiding compliance with 
the ADA, reducing the inventive to work to accommodate the disabled and to 
reduce environmental hazards overall in the workplace."222)
    1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630). 
217) 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). 
218) 42 U.S.C. §12111 (3) (emphasis added). 
219) 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (emphasis added). 
220) Amanda J. Wong, Comment, Distinguishing Speculative and Substantial Risk In the 
    Presynmptomatic Job Applicant: Interpreting the Interpretation of the Americans with 
    Disabilities Act Direct Threat Defense, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1145 (2000). 
221) Id. at 1146. 
222) Id.
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(4) Judicial Responses: Deference to EEOC (Paternalism) v. Employee's 
  Right to Decide 
              - Chevron U .S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal (2002) -
  In regards to this issue, several court decisions have supported the EEOC's 
paternalistic interpretation and "permits employers to exclude otherwise qualified 
disabled individuals from positions solely because placement in the job would pose 
a risk to their own health and safety."223) For instances, in EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 
the Fifth Circuit Court held that employer might use either direct threat defense or 
business necessity argument o prove defendant is unqualified because he poses a 
risk to his own safety or to the safety of others."224) In Rizzo v. Children's World 
Learning Centers, Inc., the Fifth Circuit Court relied on the EEOC guideline in 
defining a qualified individual as one who poses no threat o self or others.225) In 
Daugherty v. City of El Paso, the Fifth Circuit Court held that an insulin-dependent 
bus driver was not qualified as matter of law because he could injure himself or 
others.226) In LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., the First Circuit Court took 
self-risk into consideration in the direct threat decision.227) In EEOC v. Amego, 
Inc., the First Circuit Court admitted health and safety concern for the 
individua1.228) In Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit Court held 
that an employer might Pire a disabled employee who cannot prove his disability 
does not create a direct threat o his own health or safety.229) 
  However, after Wong published her article, her argument was legally endorsed 
by the Court in 2000. In Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc.,230) the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals did not follow these precedents and rejected the EEOC's 
paternalistic interpretation of the direct threat and held that an employer may not 
"shut disabled individuals out of jobs on the ground that
, by working in the job at 
issue, they may put their own health or safety at risk. ,231)
223) Scott E. Schaffer, Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc.: Conquering the Final Frontier of 
    Paternalistic Employment Practices, 33 CoNN. L. REv. 1441, 1441 (2001). 
224) EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 873-75 (5th Cir. 2000). 
225) Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers, Inc., 213 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
226) Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 698 (5th Cir. 1995). 
227) LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835-36 (1 lth Cir. 1998). 
228) EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 142-44 (lst Cir. 1997). 
229) Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446,447 (1 lth Cir. 1996). 
230) Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 213 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2000), reprinted as amended at 226 
    F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) and amended by 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 7915 (9th Cir. 2000). 
231) Id. at 1072. Also see, Julie Brienza, Ninth Circuit Upbraid Chevron.for 'Paternalistic' Decision 
    in Worker's ADA Case, 36-Aua TRIAL 80 (2000).
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  This case is praised by commentators who discussed this issue in their articles. 
For example, Adam B. Kaplan notes that "[t]he Ninth Circuit adopted the proper 
approach to applying the ` direct hreat' provision of the ADA."232) Based on his 
textual analyses of the ADA, Kaplan criticizes the EEOC's paternalistic 
interpretation of direct threat defense and argues that "an employer's `direct hreat' 
defense to daims under the ADA should retain its black letter interpretation and 
extend only to employees who cause a direct threat to 'other individuals in the 
workplace."'233) Scott E. Schaffer also notes that in Echazabal v. Chevron, "[t]he 
court appropriately held that denial of employment to 'otherwise qualified' disabled 
individuals is only permissible when their presence would pose a significant risk to 
the health or safety of others in the workplace."234) Schaffer concludes that "[t]he 
text of the ADA, its legislative history, particularly Congress' clearly articulated 
intent to graft the Arline concept of 'risk-to-others' into the defense section of the 
Act, and important policy considerations all support the Echazabal decision."235) 
Schaffer further argues that "[w]hile deference is due to an oversight agency, it 
should be limited to those instances where the agency is filling in gaps created by 
ambiguous language. No such ambiguity exists in the affirmative defense section of 
the ADA."236) Schaffer also argues that
[s]afety can only serve as a justifiable rationale for rejection when an 
employer, in defending his actions, can show that an "otherwise 
qualified" individual who can perform all the essential functions of the 
job would pose a threat to the well-being of others that cannot be 
eliminated through reasonable accommodation."237)
  Schaffer asserts that "[w]e do not tell the soldier, police officer, or miner,, who 
all face higher risks of injury or death, to stay home because they may get injury." 
Therefore, she argues that "[t]he disabled should be treated no differently when 
they make decisions to take some elevated level of risk to secure a job that best
232) Adam B. Kaplan, Father Doesn't Know Best: Rejecting Paternalistic Expansion of the `Direct 
    Threat' Defense ta Claims Under the Anaericans with Disabilities Act, 106 DICK. L. REV.389, 
   413 (2001). 
233) Id. at 391. 
234) Scott E. Schaffer, Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc.: Conquering the Final Frontier of 
    Paternalistic Employment Practices, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1441, 1485 (2001). 
235) Id. at 1484-85. 
236) Id. at 1485. 
237) Id.
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meets their overall needs."2387 
  However, the Ninth Circuit decision which rejected paternalistic interpretation 
was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2002. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Echazabal, the Supreme Court held that the EEOC regulation authorizing refusai to 
hire an individual because his performance on the job would endanger his own 
health owing to a disability did not exceed the scope of permissible rulemaking 
under the ADA.239) In other words, the Supreme Court authorized EEOC's 
interpretation and the employer can make an affirmative direct threat defense if job-
applicants and employees pose direct threat to themselves. Here, I will not further 
examine this new judicial decision but rather confirm the following matters. 
Although in Chevron, the employee at issue is not an individual with genetic 
disorder, it is not Nard to presume that the Supreme Court decision will have a great 
implication on genetic discrimination in the workplace. As mentioned before, if 
employers are able to resort to direct threat defense as including the situation of 
"threat to self
," it should be noted that the ADA protection against genetic 
discrimination also has a big legal loophole. This understanding leads us to believe 
that we cannot expect he ADA to prevent genetic discrimination in the workplace 
and need to enact genetic-specific anti-discrimination laws. In the next section, I
will review the state antidiscrimination statutes which intend to fill the legal 
loophole and provide sufficient protection for individuals with genetic disorder and 
discuss their shortcomings and shared issues that require to be examined.
iv. Inadequateness and Limitations of the ADA. 
  Chetan Gulati also addresses everal limitations of the ADA and EEOC's 
interpretations of its provisions. First of ail, Gulati states that "the ADA does not 
prohibit employers from genetic testing job candidates who have been given 
conditional offers of employment and current employees if they can demonstrate 
that the testing is job-related and that there is a demonstrated business 
necessity.i240) Secondly, "EEOC guidelines are not binding upon the courts.... [I]t 
is not clear whether the courts will accept the EEOC's interpretation of the term 
disability."241) Thirdly, "the EEOC's interpretation applies only to différentiation
238) Id. 
239) Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 122. S.Ct. 2045, in 2002 WL 1270586, 13 A.D. Cases 97 
    (U.S. Jun 10, 2002) (NO. 00-1406). 
240) Chetan Gulati, supra note 46, at 202-03. 
241) Id. at 203-04. Gulati refers to Paul Steven Miller's remark stating that "three of the justices, 
    Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, have already voiced theiropinion
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against employees because of their own genetic predisposition. Therefore, it does 
not protect individuals who are unaffected carriers of recessive or X-linked 
disorders who may be differentiated against by employers who fear that the 
children of these individuals may be at risk of genetic disorders." Moreover, "self-
interested employers may violate the law, knowing that enforcement will be 
difficult. This would be especially true for self-insured employers who directly bear 
the health care costs of their employees and who therefore have direct access to the 
medical records of their employees."242) And finally, "medical caps on medical 
coverage can be used to nullify its ultimate goal. ,243) 
  Although little attention has been paid te, it, the fourth limitation presented by 
Gulati seems to be worth addressing seriously, given the fact that lately more and 
more companies have become self-insured in which the companies legally gain 
access te, employees' genetic information. 
  Rothstein discusses this issue carefully and notes that genetic information "may 
be obtained by employers in the course of paying health insurance claims."244) 
Given the fact that "[b]y 1993, 85% of employers with 5,000-40,000 employees and 
93% of employers with more than 40,000, and 37% of employers with 50-199 were 
self-insured, ... .245) 
  Rothstein explains everal advantages of the employers if they are self-insured.
They [companies] save the profits of the commercial insurers, they can 
retain and use the earnings on amounts paid to insurers and held as 
claims reserves, and they pay no tax on premiums. Most important, in an 
era of increasing state regulation of health insurance, self-insured plans 
are exempt from state insurance laws and regulations, including state 
laws limiting policy cancellations and rate increases, and mandating 
high-risk insurance pools and the coverage of specified services and 
conditions. This exemption from state insurance law is pursuant o the 
preemptive ffect of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
    that genetic predispositions to disease would not be covered under the ADA." Id. at 203 n202 
    (2001) (citing Paul Steven Miller, Commissioner U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission, Federal 
    News Service, July 20, 2000)). 
242) Id. at 204 (2001). 
243) Id. 
244) Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace in GENETIC 
    SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN GENETIC ERA 281, 293 (Mark A. Rothstein 
    ed., Yale Univ. Press 1997). 
245) Id. at 294.
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Act of 1974 (ERISA).246)
Self-insured employers are free to amend or even terminate their plans at 
any time so long as the notice provisions of the plan are satisfied. 
Discrimination in health benefits is permissible under the ADA so long 
as it is based on valid actuarial principles and is not a subterfuge for 
disability discrimination. 247)
[S]elf-insured employers may be self-administered or they may use a 
third-party administrator to handle claims. Under the former 
arrangement, claims by health care providers are submitted for payment 
to the benefits department of the company. Typically, claims contain the 
employee's name as well as a code or description of the specific 
diagnosis or procedure. Thus, at least the employer's benefits department 
inevitably learns of the specific medical conditions of the employee or 
the employee's covered ependents.248)
  Rothstein also notes that "[i]t is not necessary for the result of particular 
diagnostic tests to be known by the employer for adverse treatment to result."249) 
He gives good examples for this.
[I]f an individual undergoes genetic testing for Huntington disease, even 
if the result of the test is not disclosed, the employer knows that the 
individual is at a 50% risk of the disease. Similarly, reimbursement for 
an annual colonoscopy for an employee under age 40 may not be 
approved in the absence of a notation that the individual was at risk of 
inherited susceptibility to colon cancer. 250)
  These observations show several loopholes of ADA's regulations in order to 
prevent genetic discrimination in the workplace. These limitations of the ADA 
prompted many states to enact its own antidiscrimination laws in the employment 
arena. In the next subsection I will review the state level legal protections against
246) Id. 
247) Id. at 295. 
248) Id. at 294. 
249) Id. 
250) Id.
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genetic discrimination and examine the problems involved.
v. Proposed Amendments to the Text of the ADA 
  In. order to avoid the definitional problems concerning "genetic" tests or 
information in the present genetic specific state statutes and to overcome the 
inadequacy of the ADA in protecting genetic privacy in the employment arena, 
Rothstein presents two proposed amendments which do not use the term "genetic." 
  Rothstein adds the following new subsection (D) after the ADA, section 
3(2)(C). "(D) having a risk of a future physical or mental impairment that would 
substantially limit one or more of the major life activities of such individual, having 
a record of such a risk, or being regarded as having such a risk."251) 
  And he asserts that "the ADA also should includewithin the definition of 
'disability' the carrier state for recessive and X-linked disorders that, if manifested, 
would substantially limit one or more of the major life activities of an individual. 
  The second proposed amendment hat Rothstein presented is designed to 
prohibit employers from gaining access to an employee's medical records 
containing non job-related genetic information. He inserts the following provision 
after the ADA section 102 (d)(3)(C), which prescribes the conditions under which 
medical examinations may be performed after a conditional offer of employment.
(D) [A] covered entity shah not require a medical examination, shall not 
undertake areview of medical records, and shah not make inquiries of an 
applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability 
or as te, the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination, 
medical records review, or inquiry is shown to be job-related and 
consistent with business necessity.252)
  As we have seen, several existing patchwork federal laws provide insufficient 
protection against genetic discrimination in the insurance and employment arena. 
In order to prohibit genetic discrimination, many believe additional legal 
protections for genetic privacy is necessary. This belief prompts many state 
legislatures to enact their own genetic-specific statutes. In the next subsection, I 
will review genetic anti-discrimination legislation at the state level.
251) Mark A. Rothstein, Reconrrnendations` Genetic Secrets.: A Policy Framework, in GENETIC 
    SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN GENETIC ERA 451, 477 (Mark A. Rothstein 
    ed., Yale Univ. Press 1997). 
252) Id. at 478.
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III. State Legislations Banning Genetic Discrimination
A. State Legal Protections in Insurance
             a. Existing State Anti-Discrimination Laws 
  According to the Table presented by Richard A. Bornstein, before the end of 
1994, only six states had enacted statutes which restrict health insurers from using 
genetic information in the underwriting process.253) According to Eric Mills 
Holmes, as of mid-1996, eighteen jurisdictions had enacted legislation concerning 
genetic testing and the use of genetic information by insurance companies and 
others.254) However, most of these jurisdictions restrict only life and disability 
insurers.255) Among these jurisdictions, only ten states enacted a comprehensive 
legislation covering any genetic testing and the use of test results in insurance 
which Holmes categorized as "the contemporary trend" rather than "the traditional 
approach" which focused only on specific genetic traits or conditions. 256) 
  After 1996, the year HIPAA was passed, in order to fill in the gaps left by 
HIPAA and to provide expanded protection for genetic information in the insurance 
settings, many states rushed to have enacted their own statutes. As a results, as of 
April 3, 2002, the Chart presented by the National Conférence of State Legislatures 
(NCSL)257) shows forty-eight states have enacted some form of genetic 
nondiscrimination laws which regulate health insurers' use of genetic information 
with the exception of Mississippi and Pennsylvania. However, the range and 
coverage differ widely by state. According to the NCSL Chart, with regard to the 
form, forty-three state statutes prohibit insurers from establishing rules for 
eligibility on the basis of genetic information, twenty-six states ban requiring 
genetic tests, forty-one state statutes prohibit the use of genetic information for risk 
selection and risk classification purposes. In regards to the type of insurance, three
253) Richard A. Bornstein, Notes & Comments, Genetic Discrimination, Insurability and 
    Legislation: A Closing of the Legal Loopholes, 4 J. L. & PoL'v 551, 604 (1996). 
254) Eric Mills Holmes, supra note 5, at 629-49. 
255) Id. at 645. 
256) Id. at 645-47. 
257) NCSL is the pre-eminent bipartisan organization founded in 1975. In its website, it is stated that 
    "It is the only organization that provides an open, bipartisan, national forum for lawmakers to 
    communicate with one another and share ideas. NCSL is an effective and respected voice for the 
    states in Washington, D.C., representing their interests-their "ideas"-before Congress,the 
    administration and federal agencies." <http://www.ncsl.org/public/guide.htm> (last visited June 
   8, 2002).
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state statutes apply only to individual health plans, seven state statutes apply only to 
group health plans, and thirty-seven state statutes apply to both individual and 
group health plans. With regard to the components of definition for protected 
genetic information, besides individual genetic test results, thirty-one state statutes 
cover the test results of family members, only three state statutes also cover family 
history, vine state statutes also include inherited characteristics, but some state 
statutes explicitly exclude routine physical measurement or standard chemical, 
blood, and urine analysis or indirect manifestations of genetic disorders from their 
coverage.258) 
  At present, according to NCSL's survey of the 2002 State Legislative Activity, 
twenty-two bills concerning genetics and health insurance have been introduced in 
twelve states in 2002, and among these, two bills have been enacted as of April 26, 
2002.259) 
  Here, I will not describe the details of each statute.260) Instead, I will examine 
the practical and normative problems of these state legislations in the next 
subsection.
                b. Shortcomings and Limitation 
  Many attempts to enact federal legislation designed to prohibit genetic 
discrimination in the health insurance arena have been inspired because of the Jack 
of uniformity and consistency regarding the scope of genetic information and 
insufficient restriction on the use of genetic information in the state statutes. 
Wendy Lovejoy notes that the diversity of state-level legislation "fails to offer 
insureds any consistent form of protection upon which they can rely."261) However, 
besides these inconsistent and insufficient protections under the state legislations, 
they have one serious technical limitation.
258) NCSL, State GeneticNondiscrimination i  Health Insurance Laws, 
    <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/Genetics/ndishlth.htm> (Ias  updated June, 2005). 
259) NCSL, Genetics and Health Insurance 2002 Legislative Activity, 
    <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/geneties/chhealthins.htm> (last updated April 26, 2002). 
260) For the survey and review of these state statutes, see, Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of 
    Genetics Exceptionalisni: Do We Need Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669, 
    692-95 (2001); Jennifer R. Taylor, Mixing the Gene Pool and the Labor Pool: Protecting 
     Workers,from Genetic Discrimination in Employment, 20 TEM. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 51, 66-70 
    (2001); Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Emplovee's Right 
    to Privacy V. Employer's Need to Know, 39 AM. Bus. L. J. 139, 172-75 (2001); William F. 
    Mulholland, Il & Ami S. Jaeger, Comment, Genetic Privacy and Discrimination: A Survevof
    State Legislation, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 317 (1999). 
261) Wendy Lovejoy, supra note 4, at 899.
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  Chetan Gulati addresses practical shortcomings of the present state legislations 
which limit price différentiation on the basis of an individual's genetic makeup.
Although states have the authority to pass genetic antidiscrimination 
laws targeting health insurers, their reach, and therefore their 
effectiveness, is significantly reduced because they are preempted by the 
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
which exempts self-insured employers from state regulation. While 98% 
of employers with over 100 employees offer some form of health 
insurance, the majority of them are self-insured, and therefore, millions 
of Americans are enrolled in plans that would be exempt from state 
genetic antidiscrimination laws.262)
  Holmes also notes that since "the Supreme Court has held that, in interpreting 
ERISA [Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974], [employer with self-
funded employee benefit plans] are to be regulated only by ERISA and are exempt 
from state insurance regulation," even "if all states pass comprehensive [anti-
discrimination] acts [in health insurance], millions of American employees under 
employer self-funded plans will not be affected.',263) 
  Because of the recognition of these limitations and shortcomings of state level 
statutes banning genetic discrimination in health insurance, many commentators 
assert to enact a comprehensive federal genetic anti-discrimination law in this 
arena.
B. State Legal Protections in Employment
             a. Existing State Anti-Discrimination Laws 
  On the state level, before the Human Genome Project started, several anti-
discrimination laws in the workplace already existed in the 1970s and 80s.264'
262) Chetan Gulati, supra note 46, at 166-67. 
263) Eric Mills Holmes, supra note 5, at 648. 
264) For example, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Florida enacted the first laws banning employment 
    discrimination on the basis of Sickle Cell trait. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.075 (1999);N.C. GEN. 
    STAT. § 95-28.1 (1999-2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:353 (West 2000). New Jersey's statute 
    of 1981 bans discrimination in employment on the basis of genetic trait such as Sickle Cell trait, 
    Hemoglobin C trait, Thalassemia trait, Tay-Sachs Trait, or Cystic Fibrosis trait. N.J. STAT. ANN. 
   §§ 10:5-5(x), 10:5-12 (West 2000).
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However, these statutes protected only specific genetic disorders uch as sickle cell 
trait. 
  It was not until the 1990s that states began to enact statutes prohibiting genetic 
discrimination generaily beyond specific genetic traits. Wisconsin became the first 
state which banned genetic testing and discrimination in the workplace in 1991.261) 
  Today, compared te, the number of state statutes banning genetic discrimination 
in health insurance, the number of state level anti-discrimination statutes in the 
workplace is fewer. However, as of April 29, 2002, thirty states have enacted some 
form of anti-discrimination law which prohibits the employer from discriminating 
against job applicants or employees in hiring, firing, and/or terras, conditions or 
privileges of employment. The main différence between these state legislations and 
the ADA is that "the ADA applies only to employers with fifteen or more 
employees whereas approximately half the state laws also cover employers with 
one to fifteen employees."266) Contrary to the insurance field, because there is no 
preemption in the employment field, "[t]he ADA operates as a minimum standard 
and does not preempt state laws that afford equal or greater protection than federal 
law."267) However, state statutes vary greatly by state in its scope of protection and 
form. With regard to the coverage, although all of these statutes ban discrimination 
based on, at least, the results of genetic tests, some states extend its coverage of 
protection. According to the Chart presented by the National Conférence of State 
Legislatures (NCSL), besides genetic test results, among these thirty states, only 
nine states cover predictive genetic information, only vine states cover also 
information about genetic testing such as the receipt of genetic services, only 
eleven states include also family history, and only half of the statutes also cover 
inherited characteristic.268) With regard to form, eighteen states prohibit the 
employer from requesting genetic information or test, twenty-three states ban 
requiring genetic information or test, sixteen states prohibit performing enetic test 
and only ten states ban obtaining genetic information or genetic test results but only 
twelve statutes prescribe specific penalties. 269) According to the survey conducted
265) Wrs. STAT. § 111.372 (West Supp. 1994). See, <http://www.nesl.org/programs/health/Genetics/ 
    ndiscrim.htm> (last visited June 8, 2002). 
266) Mark A. Rothstein, Besty D. Gelb, & Steven G. Craig, Protecting Genetic Privacy by Permitting 
    Employer Access Only To Job-related Erzzplovee Medical Information: Analvsis of a Unique 
    Minnesota Law, 24 AM. J.L. MED. & MED. 399, 404 (1998). 
267) Id. 
268) NCSL, State Genetic Employment Laws, <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ 
    ndiscrim.htm> (last updated June, 2005). 
269) Id.
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by the NCSL on State Legislative Activity in Employment in 2002, thirteen bills 
were introduced in eight states and two of those were enacted (these two new laws 
are already included in the number of thirty) and two bills are awaiting Governor 
signature or veto. 270) 
  Here, I will sot describe the details of each statute.271) Instead, I will examine 
the general problems of these state legislations in the next subsection.
                b. Shortcomings and Limitations 
  Rothstein addresses "two serious problems" entailed in the state 
antidiscrimination laws. The first problem is with regard to the definition of 
"genetic" test or "genetic" information
. He states that
[njew developments in genetics have identified a genetic composent of 
some forms of common disorders, such as asthma, hypertension, 
osteoporosis, diabetes, hypercholesterolemia, rheumatoid arthritis. Are 
routine tests that identify an individual as having such a condition 
`genetic' tests? Is a pedigree that reveals a family history of a genetic or 
multifactorial disorder 'genetic' information?272)
  The second problem Rothstein points out is that state laws do not prohibit 
authorized access to genetic information. He states that "they [state laws] do sot 
prohibit an employer from making the execution of a general medical release a 
valid condition of employment. Consequently, if the employer has a right of access 
to all the individual's medical files..., then genetic information within the files will 
be revealed."273) 
  Rothstein referred to Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) as a state statute
270) NCSL, Genetics and Employment 2002 Legislative Activity, 
    <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/chemploy.htm> (las  updated June 3, 2002). 
271) For the survey and review of these state statutes, sec, Sonia M. Suter, supra note 260, at 692-95; 
    Jennifer R. Taylor, Mixing the Gene Pool and the Labor Pool: Protecting Workers from Genetic 
    Discrimination in Employment, 20 TEM. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 51, 66-70 (2001); Marisa Anne 
    Pagnattaro, Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee's Right to Privacy V. 
    Employer's Need ta Know, 39 AM. Bus. L. J. 139, 172-75 (2001); William F. Mulholland, II & 
    Ami S. Jaeger, Comment, Genetic Privacy and Discrimination: A Survev of State Legislation,39
    JURIMETRICS J. 317 (1999). 
272) Mark A. Rothstein, The Lait, of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace in GENETIC 
    SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN GENETIC ERA 281, 293 (Mark A. Rothstein 
    ed., Yale Univ. Press 1997). 
273) Id.
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which can escape from these problems because it "prohibits all non job-related 
medical examinations at any stage of the employment process and limits 
employers' access to applicant and employee medical records."274)
IV. Federal Bills in the U.S. Congress
A. Proposed Federal Bills in the U.S. Congress (1995-2002)
  As we have seen, state statutes vary widely, state by state, in its coverage and 
form. Moreover, in some states, legal protection against genetic discrimination is 
not sufficient. Under these circumstances, many commentators assert enacting 
federal level genetic-specific anti-discrimination laws to protect genetic privacy and 
confidentiality of genetic information of the individuals in order to secure a 
consistent and uniform minimum safeguard among the fifty states. 
  Since 1995, many federal bills have been proposed both in the Senate and House 
of Representatives.275) Seven bills were introduced to the 104th U.S. Congress 
through 1995 to 1996,276) and in the 105th Congress in 1997, nine bills were 
proposed,277) and in the 106th Congress through 1999 to 2000, eight bills were
274) Id. (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.02, subd. 1(b)(9)(i)(b), 363.03 subd. 4(b) (West Supp. 1995). 
275) Fora review of the content of the proposed bills introduced in the 104th Congress, see, Joanne 
    Seltzer, Note, The Cassandra Complex: An Employer's Dilemma in the Genetic Workplace, 27 
    HOFSTRA L. REv. 411 441-45 (1998). For a survey of the genetic antidiscrimination bills 
    introduced in the 105th Congress, see, Jeremy A. Colby, Note & Comment, An Analysisof 
    Genetic Discrimination Legislation Proposed by the 105th Congress, 24 AM. J.L. & MEn. 443, 
    468-476 (1998); Lynn E. Egan, Note, Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance, 24 J. LEGIS. 
    237, 244-46 (1998); Kourtney L. Pickens, Comments, Don't Judge Me by My Genes: A Survey 
    of Federal Genetic Discrimination Legislation, 34 TULSA. L.J. 161, 176-80 (1998); Bryce A. 
    Lenox, Comment, Genetic Discrimination in Insurance and Employment: Spoiled Fruits of the 
    Human Genome Project, 23 U. DAYTON L. REv. 189, 209-11 (1997). For the note on the bill 
    introduced in the 106th Congress, see, Wendy Lovejoy, supra note 4, at 905-06. 
276) The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1996, S. 1694, 104th 
    Cong. (1996) (sponsored by Olympia Snowe); H.R. 3477, 104th Cong. (1996) (sponsored by 
    Joseph Kennedy) (amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938); Genetic Confidentiality 
    and Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, S. 1898, 104th Cong. (1996) (Pete Domenici); The Genetic 
    Fairness Act of 1996, S. 1600, 104th Cong. (1996) (Dianne Feinstein); The Genetic Information 
    Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1995, H.R. 2748, 104th Cong. (1995) (Louis 
    Slaughter); The Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1995, S. 1416, 104thCong. 
    (1995) (Mark Hatfield); The Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 2690, 
    104th Cong. (1995) (Cliff Stearns). 
277) Genetic Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, S. 422, 105th Cong. (1997) (Pete
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proposed.278) And in the 107th Congress through 2001 to 2002, four genetics-
specific bills have been introduced.279) However, ail of these bills have failed to be 
passed. 
  The parallel bills entitled The Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance 
and Employment Act of 2001 were introduced on February 13, 2001 in the Senate 
by Tom Daschle and in the House by Louis M. Slaughter. The bills amend existing 
federal laws such as ERISA, the Public Health Service Act, and the Internai 
Revenue Code to provide comprehensive and sufficient legal protection against 
genetic discrimination. 2'o) The bills define genetic information broadly as to cover 
"(i) information about an individual's genetic tests; (ii) information about genetic 
tests of family members of the individual; or (iii) information about the occurrence
    Domenici); Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, H.R. 2198, 105th Cong. (1997) 
    (Cliff Stearns); The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997, 
    H.R. 306, 105th Cong. (1997) (Louis Slaughter); The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in 
    Health Insurance Act of 1997, S. 89, 105th Cong. (1997) (Olympia Snowe); Genetic Information 
    Health Insurance Discrimination Act of 1997, H.R. 328, 105th Cong. (1997) (GeraldSolomon); 
    The Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, H.R. 341, 105th Cong. (1997) (Cliff 
    Steams); Genetic Protection in Insurance Coverage Act, H.R. 2216, 105th Cong. (1997) (Joseph 
    Kennedy); The Genetic Justice Act, S. 1045, 105th Cong. (1997) (Tom Daschle); Genetic 
    Nondiscrimination in the Workplace Act, H.R. 2215, 105th Cong. (1997) (Joseph Kennedy) 
    (amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938). 
278) Genetic Information Health Insurance Nondiscrimination Act of 1999, H.R. 293, 106th Cong. 
    (1999) (amendment o the Public Health Service Act and the Employee Retirement Income 
    Security Act of 1974) (John Sweeney); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health 
    Insurance Act of 1999, H.R. 306, 106th Cong. (1999) (Louis Slaughter); Genetic 
    Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act of 1999, H.R. 2457, 106thCong. 
    (1999) (Louis Slaughter); Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1999, H.R. 2555,106th 
    Cong. (1999) (Cliff Stearns); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health InsuranceAct of 
    1999, S. 543, 106th Cong. (1999) (Olympia Snowe); Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health 
    Insurance and Employment Act of 1999, S. 1322, 106th Cong. (1999) (Tom Daschle); Genetic 
    Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1999, 146 Cong. Rec. S6152 (daily 
    ed. June 29, 2000) (Senate Amendment 3691 to H.R. 4577) (James Jeffords). 
279) Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act of 2001, S. 318, 107th 
    Cong. (2001) (Tom Daschle); Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment 
   Act of 2001, H.R. 602, 107th Cong. (2001) (Louis Slaughter); Genetic Information 
   Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 2001, S. 382, 107th Cong. (2001) (Olympia 
    Snowe); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2002, S. 1995, 107th Cong. (2002) 
    (Olympia Snowe). For a survey of the genetic antidiscrimination bills introduced in the 107th 
    Congress, sec Sonia M. Suter, supra note 260, ai 696-68; Jennifer S. Geetter, supra note 102, at 
    53-55; Louise M. Slaughter, The Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance and EmploJmaent 
    Act: H.R. 602, 18 N.Y.L. ScH. J. Hum. RTS. 1 (2001). 
280) Jennifer S. Geetter, supra note 102, at 54.
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of a disease or disorder in family members."281) 
  In the insurance settings, the bills regulate the insurers' access and use of the 
broadly defined genetic information. Under the bills, it is prohibited, based on 
"protected genetic information concerning an individual (or information about a 
request for or the receipt of genetic services by such individual or family member 
of such individual)," for insurers to establish rules for eligibility to enroll in health 
insurance coverage and adjust premium rates in the individual market and also to 
dent' eligibility or adjust premium or contribution rates in the group health 
plans. 282) Moreover, the bills limit insurers' access to genetic information. The 
bills ban "insurers from requesting, requiring, collecting, or purchasing such 
genetic information from an individual or a family member; from disclosing such 
genetic information without authorization; or from requesting or requiring 
individuals or family members to undergo genetic testing."283) 
  However, Jennifer S. Geetter notes a loopholein the insurance setting under the 
bill. 
   [T]he bill still permits underwriting on the basis of "information about 
   physical exams of the individual, and other information that indicates the 
    current health status of the individual" and "information about chemical, 
    blood, or urine analyses of the individual, unless these analyses are 
    genetic tests." Thus, insurers could still base coverage determinations on 
    genetic information that was gathered incidentally, and could still make 
    coverage decisions based on a genetic disorder once the individualwas 
    symptomatic and these symptoms manifested themselves during a 
   physical examination of the individual.284)
In the employment settings, under the bills, 
 [it is prohibited for employers] to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
 any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
 respect o compensation, terras, conditions, or privileges of employment 
 of the individual [or otherwise deprive an individual of employment 
 opportunities], because of protected genetic information with respect o 
 the individual . . . or information about a request for or the receiptof 
 genetic services by such individual or family member of such
281) S. 318, 107th Cong. § 201 (6) (2001). 
282) S. 318, 107th Cong. § 101 (a)(2)(A), § 102 (b)(2) (2001). 
283) Sonia M. Suter, supra note 260, at 697-98. 
284) Jennifer S. Geetter, supra note 102, at 55.
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individua1.2s5i
  Moreover, the bills prohibit "employers from requesting, requiring, collecting, 
or purchasing such genetic information from an individual or a family member."286) 
Additionally, "the bills emphasize that the federal law would not supersede any 
provision of state law that 'provides equal or greater protection to an individual 
than the rights under this Act."'287) 
  On March 6, 2002, another bill entitled Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act of 2002 was introduced by Senator Snow.288) However, the odds that any of 
these bills introduced in the 107th Congress would be enacted were very low. 
According to the WESTLAW Billcast (accessed June 9th 2002), the odds that these 
bills pals the Senate Committee and Floor, and House Committee and Floor ranged 
from only seven percent o zero percent and did not become a law.
B. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003 and 2005
  In May 2003, just after the completion of the Human Genome Project, Senator 
Olympia J. Snowe (R-Maine) reintroduced a bipartisan bill called the Genetic 
Information Non-Discrimination Act (S. 1053). The bill prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of genetic information in health insurance and the workplace. On October 
14, 2003, the U.S. Senate passed the bill by a vote of 95-0. This is the first time the 
Senate has passed a genetic nondiscrimination bill. However, the US House of 
Representatives did not pass the bill. 
  In February, 2005, by a vote of 98 to 0, the US Senate passed the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act, introduced by U.S. Senator Olympia J. Snowe 
(R-Maine).289) According to the Bill Tracking by the Office of Legislative Policy 
and Analysis (OLPA):290)
285) Id. at 698 (alteration in original) (quoting S. 318 § 202; H.R. 602 § 202). 
286) Id. S. 318 § 203; H.R. 602 § 202. 
287) Id. S. 318 § 209(3); H.R. 602 § 208(3). 
288) Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2002, S. 1995, 107th Cong. (2002) (Olympia 
    Snowe). 
289) S.306. Official Title of the bill is "A bill to prohibit discrimination on the basis of genetic 
    information with respect to health insurance and employment." The full text of the bill can be 
    downloaded at <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s 109-306> 
290) The website of the Office of Legislative Policy and Analysis (OLPA) states that their mission 
    "serves as the principal office within the Office of the Director (OD)
, National Institutes of 
    Health (NIH), for providing legislative analysis, policy development, and liaison with the
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The bill would prohibit health insurers in both the group and individual 
markets from (1) using genetic information to impose enrollment 
restrictions or to adjust premium or contribution amounts, (2) requesting 
genetic testing or results except as necessary for treatment, payment, or 
health care operations, or (3) requesting or requiring the use of genetic 
information for the purposes of underwriting. It defines a genetic test as 
an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or 
metabolites that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes. 
S. 306 specifically would exclude an analysis of proteins or metabolites 
that does not detect genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes, or 
an analysis of proteins or metabolites directly related to a manifested 
disease, disorder, or pathological condition that could reasonably be 
detected by a health care professional with appropriate training and 
expertise in the field of medicine involved. The bill defines genetic 
information as information about the genetic tests of an individual or 
family member, or the occurrence of a disease or disorder in family 
members of an individual. It also specifically would exclude information 
about he age or sex of an individua1.29 i
  According tothe URL of ASCO (American Society of Clinical Oncology)292) 
as of February 17, 2005, the date the U.S. Senate passed the bill, there is a total of 
26 cosponsors forthis bill (14 Democrats, 11 Republicans, 1 Independent). Since 
its passage, the bill has been waiting to be brought to a floor vote in the House of 
Representatives. 
  On March 10, 2005 a bipartisan group of over 100 members of Congress 
introduced the "Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2005 in the 109th 
Congress,"293) Thebill was introduced byRepresentatives JudyBiggert (R-IL), 
Louise Slaughter (D-NY), Bob Ney (R-OH), and Anna Eshoo (D-CA) and includes
    Congress. OLPA facilitates and enhances the relationship between NIH and the Congress; 
    advances NIH legislative priorities; and ensures that the NIH community receivesessential 
    information, advice, and guidance regarding developments in the Congress that affectNIH." 
    <http://olpa.od.nih.gov/about/> (last visited December 1, 2005) 
291) <http://olpa.od.nih.gov/tracking/109/senate bills/sessionl/s-306.asp> (last visited December 6, 
   2005) 
292) <http://capwiz.com/asco/home/#> (last visited December 6, 2005). 
293) HR 1227. Official Title of the bill is "To prohibit discrimination on the basis of genetic 
    information with respect to health insurance and employment." The full text of the bill can be 
    downloaded at <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-1227>
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a group of bipartisan cosponsors.294) The main provisions of the bill are identical to 
S. 306. According to the URL of ASCO (American Society of Clinical 
Oncology),295) asof November 8, 2005, there is a total of 159 cosponsors for this 
bill (93 Democrats, 65 Republicans, 1 Independent).296) ASCO gives a brief 
summary of the bill:
[the bill amends] [e]mployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) and the Public Health Service Act to expand the prohibition 
against discrimination by group health plans and health insurance issuers 
in the group and individual markets on the oasis of genetic information 
or services to prohibit: (1) enrollment and premium discrimination based 
on information about a request for or receipt of genetic services; and (2) 
requiring genetic testing. Sets forth penalties for violations. Amends title 
XVIII (Medicare) of the Social Security Act to prohibit issuers of 
Medicare supplemental policies from discriminating on the basis of 
genetic information. Extends medical privacy and confidentiality rules to 
the disclosure of genetic information. Makes it an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or 
training program to discriminate against an individual or deprive such 
individual of employment opportunities because of genetic information. 
Prohibits the collection and disclosure of genetic information, with 
certain exceptions. Establishes a Genetic Nondiscrimination Study 
Commission to review the developing science of genetics and advise 
Congress on the advisability of providing for a disparate impact cause of 
action under this Act.297)
  Since President Bush has expressed his support for the bill in a Statement of 
Administrative Policy,298) if the bill should be passed, the U.S. President would sign 
the bill and the first stand alone federal egislation which prohibits potential genetic 
discrimination in the insurance and employment settings would be enacted.
294) <http://www.genome.gov/pfv.cfm?pageid=l 1510230> (last updated August 2005) (last visited 
    December 1,2005). 
295) <http://capwiz.com/asco/home/#> (last visited December 6, 2005). 
296) <http://capwiz.com/asco/issues/bills/?bill=7410196> (last visited December 6, 2005) 
297) Id. 
298) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/109-1/s306sap-s.pdf
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V. Conclusion
  In this paper, I examined the scope and appropriateness of current patchwork 
legal protections against genetic discrimination and identified their limitations 
(Section II). First, I reviewed the existing federal aws and regulations in which 
legal professionals have tried to find legal protection against genetic discrimination. 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Executive Order, Regulations (policy guidelines) of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and several judicial decisions 
related to the issue have been reviewed. Then I demonstrated that there were many 
loopholes in prohibiting the use of genetic information in discriminatory ways and 
confirmed that none of these federal laws and regulations provides sufficient legal 
protection against genetic discrimination, if any, in the workplace and insurance 
fields respectively (Section II). Next, I examined whether state genetic-specific 
anti-discrimination statutes could fill the gaps of insufficient protection left by 
patchwork and sporadic federal laws (Section III). By surveying state statutes 
briefly, I confirmed that the coverage and form of the state statutes vary greatly 
state by state, and therefore, could not provide consistent legal protection. 
Accordingly, I have reached the tentative opinion, as many commentators have, that 
a comprehensive f deral evel legislation which specifically and uniformly intends 
to prohibit genetic discrimination is needed in order to eliminate the fear of genetic 
discrimination. In the last section I review many attempts to enact a comprehensive 
federal aw since the mid 90s and the recently passed genetic nondiscrimination bill 
in the U.S. senate (Section IV).
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